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This Article analyzes President Barack Obama's legacy for an indigenous 
people--nearly 125 years in the making--alld how that legacy is IlOW in consid-
erable jeopardy with the election of Donald]. Trump. This Article is the first to 
specifically critique the hallmark of Obama's reconciliatory legacy for Native 
Hawaiians: all administrative rule that establishes a process in which the United 
States would reestablish a government-to-/!,overnment relationship with Native 
Hawaiians, the only indigenous people in America without a path toward federal 
recognition. In the Article, Obama's rule--an attempt to provide Native 
Hawaiians with recognition and }?,reater control over their own affairs to counter 
their negative socio-economic status-is analyzed within the historical and political 
context of a government coy to live up to its reconciliatory promises. The Article 
analyzes past attempts to establish a government-to-government relationship and 
considers new avenues for reaching this end. The Article concludes that although 
the rule brings the federal government closer to its ideals of justice, it does not go far 
enough to en,'?,ender true social healing, specifically because of the uncertainty that 
the rule will be followed by a conservative Trump Administration that will likely be 
hostile toward Native Hawaiians and other ind('?,enous communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The locals in Hawai'i are accustomed to the holiday vacation of the 
first family. Some mind little the additional traffic congestion caused by the 
motorcade or the slight economic boost for the local shave ice shops or 
high-end restaurants. After all, Hawai'i is a respite for America's only is-
land-born President, Barack Obama. Yet the Obama-Hawai'i connection 
often brings unsolicited attention to the struggles facing the island State, 
including Hawai'i's homeless ness crisis, dilapidating infrastructure, and in-
creasing cost-of-living. 1 Despite its problems-problems that are not 
unique to the fiftieth state-Hawai'i was Obama's "home state."2 
In 1961, a time when interracial marriage was illegal in parts of the 
country,3 Ann Dunham, a Kansas-born college student, and Barack 
Obama, Sr., an economist from Kenya, welcomed their son and future 
president. 4 "Bar" or "Barry," as he was colloquially called by his friends 
and family, would be raised by his mother and grandparents in the multi-
cultural State of Hawai'i. 5 He was sent to a prestigious preparatory school 
1. See, e.g., Guy Adams, America's Homeless Crisis, Washes Up in Ovama's Birthplace, IN-
DEPENDENT (Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/americas-
homeless-crisis-washes-up-in-obanus-birthplace-2356870.htmi. 
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to Leaders from the Pacific Island Con-
ference of Leaders and the intenUltional Union for the Conservation of Nature World Conservatioll COI'-
gress (Sept. 1, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov (follow link then use the query bar 
to search archives with title of the piece). 
3. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a state law prohibiting 
interracial marriage because "the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race 
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State"). 
4. STU GLAUBERMAN & JF.R.R Y BURRIS, TI [E DREAM BEGINS: How HAWAII SllAPED 
BARACK OBAMA 37-38 (2009). 
5. BARACK OHAMA, DREAMS H>"OM My FATIlER: A STORY OF RACE AND INIIERI-
TANCE 23-25 (Crown Publishers 2004) (hereinafter DREAMS I'ROM My FATHER]. 
SPRJNG 2017] Lep,acy in Paradise 275 
before making his way to college, law school, the urban communities of 
Chicago, the United States Senate, and the White House. 6 Through his 
adventures across the nation, Hawai'i remained special to Obama: "No 
place else could have provided me with the environment, the climate, in 
which I could not only grow but also get a sense of being loved[.]"7 He 
continued, "[t]here is no doubt that the residue of Hawaii will always stay 
with me, and that it is a part of my core, and that what's best in me, and 
what's best in my message, is consistent with the tradition ofHawaii."8 He 
even highlighted his upbringing in Hawai'i as a symbol of his own political 
philosophy: "The opportunity that Hawaii offered-to experience a vari-
ety of cultures in a climate of mutual respect-became an integral part of 
my world view, and a basis for the values that I hold most dear."9 It was 
this utopian view, often referred to as the "Aloha Spirit," that skyrocketed 
Obama to the highest echelons of political power. 10 
However, lurking behind the fac,:ade of an idyllic paradise home of 
multi-cultural acceptance and generosity is the history of a people dislo-
cated from their land and stripped of their self-governance-a history 
Obama himself characterized as "[t]he ugly conquest of the native 
Hawaiians through aborted treaties and crippling disease brought by the 
missionaries[.]"ll This history, which runs the all-to-familiar narrative of 
a colonizing nation forcing itself into and then upon a smaller nation, is 
not unique to Hawai'i. 12 But, in the case ofHawai'i, there is no doubt that 
6. Congregationalist missionaries founded Obama's preparatory school, Punahou 
School, in 1841. See Philip Rucker, With Obama's Rise, Hawaii School Adds to Its DistinctiollS, 
WASH. POST Gan. 3, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article120091 
011021 AR2009010202325.hmu. 
7. Philip Rucker, Hawaii's Influence on Bamek Obama, WASH. POST Gan. 2, 2009), http:/ 
Iwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/01/AR2009010102035.hm1l. 
8. Id. 
9. B.J. Reyes, Punahou Left Lasting Impression on Obama, HONOLULU STAR-BULL. (Feb. 
8, 2007), http://archives.starbulletin.com/2007 102/08/news/story02.htn1l. 
10. 152 CONGo REc. S5576 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Obama) ("In 
addition to its scenic landscapes and rich history, it is the living legacy of aloha-the spirit of 
openness and friendliness that is ingrained in the shared, local culture that shapes and enhances 
each island encounter and experience."); see Haw. Rev. Stat. § 5-7.5(a) (1993) (describing 
"Aloha" as "mutual regard and affection and extend[ing] warmth in caring with no obligation 
in return ... [and] the essence of relationships in which each person is important to every other 
person for collective existence"). 
11. DREAMS FROM My FATHER, supra note 5, at 23. For purposes of this Article, the 
tenns "Native Hawaiian" and "Hawaiian" will be used interchangeably to refer to any individual 
of Hawaiian ancestry regardless of blood quantum. The term "native Hawaiian" will be used 
throughout this Article to refer to individuals of not less than one-half part Hawaiian ancestry as 
defined by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. See Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 67 
Pub. L. No. 34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921). 
12. Many scholars have articulated the tragic history of colonization visited upon the 
Hawaiian people. See, e.g., Melody K. MacKenzie, Native Hawaiians and U.S. Law, in NATIVE 
HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE 268-71 (MacKenzie ed., 2015) (discussing the way in which the 
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the United States actively participated in the overthrow of the Kingdom of 
Hawai'i and, under a conservative administration, shepherded annexation 
despite vocal opposition from Native Hawaiians. 13 Indeed, the federal gov-
ernment itself recognized its involvement and "apologize[d] to Native 
Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow 
of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of 
agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights 
of Native Hawaiians to self-determination."14 Over the years, and despite 
several efforts, the issue of reconciliation for these past injustices has, thus 
far, eluded Native Hawaiians. 
With the ascension of Hawai'i's favorite son to the highest seat of 
American political power, could justice through formal political recogni-
tion of Native Hawaiians as a self-governing polity finally be realized? In-
deed, the Obama Administration captured the need for equality: "As a 
political community entitled to self-determination, the Native Hawaiian 
people have the same fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-
government as any Indian tribe. Native Hawaiians should not be relegated 
to second-class status among our Nation's indigenous peoples."15 This Arti-
cle seeks to address the hallmark of President Obama's reconciliatory leg-
acy for Hawai'i's indigenous community: an administrative rule that sets a 
process in which the United States would reestablish a government-to-
government relationship with Native Hawaiians. 
To contextualize President Obama's historic and unprecedented ac-
tion, Part I of this Article begins with an overview of the failed federal 
reconciliation efforts during the administration of President George W. 
Bush ("Bush II Administration") following the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Rice v. Cayetano. 16 Part II then details the hodgepodge, 
yet innovative, strategy for obtaining Native Hawaiian reconciliation-a 
tripartite effort that wove together the State of Hawai'i's compilation of a 
list of Native Hawaiians, a private organization's reorganization of a Ha-
waiian governing entity, and the centerpiece of the effort, the Obama Ad-
ministration's rule that set a pathway to reestablish a government-to-
government relationship with a Hawaiian governing body. To assess the 
Kingdom of Hawai'i was "deprived of the most basic right of a nation, the right to exist"); 
HAUNANI-KA Y TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGIITER: COI.ONIALlSM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN 
HAWAI'I 1-19 (2004) (detailing the history of Hawai'i's colonization). 
13. Some have argued that Hawai'i was never properly annexed to the United States. See 
Williamson Chang, Darkness Over Hawaii: The Annexation Myth Is the Greatest Obstacle to ProJ(ress, 
16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POI:V J. 70, 71-72 (2015) (arguing that the United States has no jurisdic-
tion in Hawai'i because Hawai'i was not properly annexed). This Article takes no position on the 
validity of the argument that, under international law, the United States lacked jurisdiction over 
Hawai'i. 
14. Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). 
15. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23, Alcina v. State, 141 F. Supp. 3d 
1106 (D. Haw. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00322-JMS-BMK) (emphasis added). 
16. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
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constitutional validity of this multi-faceted reconciliation effort, Part III of 
this Article analyzes: (1) Akina v. Hawaii,17 which challenged the State's 
compilation of a roll and the independent entity Na'i Aupuni's private 
reorganization of a Hawaiian governing body; and (2) President Obama's 
use of his executive authority. Using the Social Healing Through Justice 
framework, Part IV of this Article then critiques the most important aspect 
of the tripartite effort: President Obama's action. In the end, this Article 
concludes that the rule-indeed Obama's reconciliatory legacy for Native 
Hawaiians-does not go far enough to engender true reconciliation and 
address the deep societal wounds that have plagued Hawai'i's indigenous 
people for over a century. 
1. THE CONTEXT AND ASCENSION OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S 
NATIVE HAWAIIAN LEGACY 
Barack Obama has not minced words when talking about the linger-
ing effects of colonization on Native Hawaiians: 
As someone who grew up in Hawaii and has enormous love for 
the Hawaiian culture, I also think it is important . . . [to] ac-
knowledge [ ] that there have been difficulties within the com-
munity of Native Hawaiians, oftentimes despite the fact that we 
are visitors to Hawaii; that many times particularly young Na-
tive Hawaiians have had difficulties in terms of unemployment, 
in terms of being able to integrate into the economy of the 
islands, that some of the historical legacies of what has hap-
pened in Hawaii continue to burden the Native Hawaiians for 
many years into the future. IS 
To address these negative "historical legacies" that have manifested them-
selves in various negative socio-economic indicators for Native 
Hawaiians,19 the State ofHawai'i and the federal government have, for the 
past forty years, made some efforts to reconcile. 
For the State, following the resurgence of the Hawaiian culture and 
the courageous steps taken by Hawaiian protestors in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the people of Hawai'i, through a vote following the State's 1978 Constitu-
tional Convention, approved a constitutional amendment creating the Of-
17. 141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Haw. 2015). 
18. 152 CONGo REc. S5576 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Obama). 
19. Native Hawaiians continue to have the highest rates of incarceration, homelessness, 
and serious illness, and the lowest rates of educational attainment and family income. See OfFICE 
01' HAWAIIAN A!TA!R.S, NATIVE HAWAIIAN HEAL"],!! FACT SllEET 2015 2-16 (2015), http://19 
0£32x2y133s804xzaOgf14. wpengine. netdna -cdn. com/ wp-content/ uploads/Volume-III -Social-
Deterrninants-of-Health-FINAL.pdf Indeed, recent studies have shown that Native Hawaiians 
are expected to live to 74.3 years of age compared to the state's average of 80.5 years; and 20.5 
percent of Native Hawaiian households received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
benefits in 2013 compared to 11.3 percent of the state's population overall. ld. at 4, 9. 
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flce of Hawaiian Affairs.20 The drafters of the amendment envisioned the 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs as an entity that would act to better the condi-
tions of Native Hawaiians, and serve as a receptacle for reparations between 
the Hawaiian community, the State, and the federal governments. 21 The 
agency was to be funded through revenues from the public lands trust that 
was established at Statehood to, among other things, improve the condi-
tion of Hawaiians.22 Pursuant to the State constitutional amendment, Na-
tive Hawaiians would elect other Native Hawaiians from across the State to 
serve as trustees of the entity.23 The goal of the entity was reconciliatory: 
to "unite Hawaiians as a people[,]" to ensure that "Hawaiians have more 
impact on their future[,]" and to provide the agency with "maximum 
independence. "24 On the federal side, after multiple failed attempts at 
seeking reparations for Native Hawaiians for the tragic effects of coloniza-
tion, in 1993-one hundred years after the overthrow of the Kingdom of 
Hawai'i-Congress approved and President Bill Clinton signed into law 
the Apology Resolution. That law set forth an apology on behalf of the 
American people for the actions of Americans in supporting and orches-
trating the overthrow of the Kingdom and called for reconciliatory efforts 
between Native Hawaiians and the United States.25 
With support in the State and key support in the federal government, 
the tiIne was opportune for true reconciliation. That time, however, 
quickly dissipated as the political winds shifted and a conservative regime 
gained control of the federal government. 
A. "That Difficult Terrain" 
In the early months of2000, over twenty years after the State consti-
tutional amendment created the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the U.S. Su-
preme Court sent shockwaves through the Hawaiian Islands when it 
dismantled the State's reconciliatory framework by striking down the pro-
vision mandating that voters for trustees of the entity be Native Hawai-
20. See, e.g., Davianna McGregor-Alegado, Hawaiians: OYj!allizinJ( in tIle 19705, 7 AMERA-
SIA J. 29, 29-55 (1980); TOM COffMAN, THE ISLAND EDGE 01' AMERJCA: A POLITICAL HIS-
TORY Or HAWAI'I 289-316 (2003). 
21. STATE OF HAWAI'I, PROCEEDINGS Or TIlE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Or 
1978, VOLUME I, at 1018 (1980). 
22. The federal government required the State of Hawai'i, upon its admission into the 
Union, to hold public lands and its associated revenue in trust for several purposes, including the 
betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians. See An Act to Provide for the Admission of 
the State of Hawaii into the Union, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4 (1959). The State 
subsequently designated that a portion of the Section 5(f) trust funds from these Public Trust 
Lands would be given to the Office of Hawaiian AfEUrs. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 6. 
23. HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 5 invalidated in part by Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 
(2000). 
24. STATE OF HAWAI'I, PROCEEDINGS OF TIlE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 01' 
1978, VOL. I, at 1018 (1980). 
25. Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). 
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ian.26 In Rice v. Cayetano, the Rehnquist Court continued the conservative 
march against indigenous rights. 27 
With a romanticized and narrowly-tailored view of Hawai'i political 
and legal history,28 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority, con-
cluded that the voting scheme for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, although 
argued as being based on ancestry and political status, was intended to 
serve as a racial classification: "The State, in enacting the legislation before 
us, has used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose."29 Jus-
tice Kennedy boldly added: "One of the principal reasons race is treated as 
a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a 
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and 
essential qualities. "30 Justice Kennedy had the audacity to then cite the 
following quote about racial equality from a 1943 decision, Hirabayashi v. 
United States, in which an earlier Court held that the internment and cur-
fews of Japanese Americans by the American government during World 
War II was constitutionally firm: "Distinctions between citizens solely be-
cause of their ancestry, are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."31 
26. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 522 (holding that "the elections of OHA trustee are elections of 
the State, not of a separate quasi sovereign, and they are elections to which the Fifteenth Amend-
ment applies .... A State may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this 
law does so."); see also Eric K. Yamamoto & Catherine C. Betts, Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny 
Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 541, 
544-45 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., Foundation Press, 2008); Chris K. Iijima, 
Race over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century 
Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 91, 98-108 (2000). 
27. The Rehnquist Court has been criticized for its hostility toward indigenous interests, 
which was a radical departure from Courts of the past. See Jeanette Wolfley, Rice v. Cayetano: The 
Supreme COllrt Declines to Extend Federal Indian LAw Principles to Native Hawaiians Sovereign Rights, 
3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'y J. 359, 359-60 (2002): 
In the last ten terms, Indian tribal interests have lost seventy-seven percent of all 
their cases before the Rehnquist Court; they lost only thirty-six percent of their 
cases before the Burger Court. Tribal interests have not won a single case before 
the Supreme Court involving state jurisdiction over non-Indians, and they have 
lost seventy-three percent of the cases involving tribal jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers. It is difficult to find another class of cases or type of litigant that has fared 
worse before the Supreme Court. 
Id. The conservative majority's judicial activism has led one scholar to characterize one of their 
pivotal decisions as "courting anarchy." See Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
699, 700 (2002) (describing the Court's political decision and the results of Bush v. Gore as 
embodying "considerable anarchy and chaos"). 
28. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 527-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
29. !d. at 515 (majority opinion). 
30. Id.at517. 
31. Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
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As a defense-a defense with which the federal district court and 
Ninth Circuit panel agreed32-the State argued that the exclusion of non-
Hawaiians from voting for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was 
permissible under Morton v. Mancari, which allowed differential treatment 
of Native Americans.33 The Court, however, brushed aside the Mancari 
analogy. Justice Kennedy noted that the preferential hiring policy in Man-
cari, while having a racial component, was specifically directed towards 
members of "federally-recognized" tribes-a status that had not yet been 
conferred upon Native Hawaiians by the political branches.34 Accordingly, 
while the history of colonization of Native Americans was very similar to 
that of Native Hawaiians, the Court in Rice remarked that the State wanted 
to "extend the limited exception of Mancari to a new and larger dimen-
sion."35 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately sidestepped deciding whether 
to extend Mancari because, according to the Court, "[i]t [was] a matter of 
some dispute ... whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it 
does the Indian tribes. "36 Instead of navigating "that difficult terrain," Jus-
tice Kennedy chose to decide the issue based on the State's lack of author-
ity to enact the type of voting scheme at issue.37 The Court thereby 
concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment was applicable because the elec-
tion of trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs "are elections of the 
State, not of a separate quasi sovereign[.]"38 In refusing to definitively rule 
on the Mancari issue, the Court signaled its unwillingness to decide what, if 
any, was the "political status" of Native Hawaiians. The determination of 
"political status" would thus need to instead be made by the political 
branches. 
32. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 1998); Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. 
Supp. 1547, 1554 (D. Haw. 1997). 
33. See infra part III.e. 
34. Rice, 528 U.S. at 519-20. 
35. !d. at 520. 
36. See id. at 518-19. 
37. !d. at 519. The Court also rejected the State's argument that this case was similar to a 
line of decisions where the Court held that the principle of "one man, one vote" did not apply 
in certain circumstances. The Court held, however, that "[t]he Fifteenth Amendment has inde-
pendent meaning and force. A State may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of 
race, and this law does so." !d. at 522. Finally, the Court dismissed the State's defense that the 
voting restriction does no more than ensure an alignment of interests between the fiduciaries and 
the beneficiaries of the trust. According to the Court, it was "not clear that the voting classifica-
tion is symmetric with the beneficiaries of the programs OHA administers" (i.e., even though 
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' funds from section 5(f) of the Admissions Act were eamlarked for 
the benefit of "native Hawaiians," the State permits both "native Hawaiians" and "Hawaiians" to 
vote for trustees). Id. at 523. More importantly, the Court added, the State's argument £ailed 
because it rested on the "demeaning" premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow 
more qualified than others to vote on certain matters. !d. 
38. [d. at 522. 
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The harm from the Rice majority opinion is in its legitimization of 
American superiority over indigenous peoples.)'! The Rice majority, as one 
scholar concluded, "turned a blind eye to history."4o In a scathing dissent, 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote: "The Court's holding today rests largely 
39. In a concurring opinion, liberal Justice Stephen Breyer (with whom Justice David 
Souter agreed) joined the result of the majority's decisions, but specifically took aim at the Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs' electorate and the "trust" that was established. Justice Breyer concluded that 
the State's effort to justifY its voting rules through analogy to a trust for an Indian tribe should be 
rejected because there was no "trust" to native Hawaiians established. See id. at 525 (Breyer, j., 
concurring). He specifically concluded that the State Constitution's use of the word "trust" 
when referring to the 1.2 million acres of ceded lands, see supra note 22, bore little resemblance 
to a trust for native Hawaiians because section 5(f) of the Admissions Act made clear that the 
ceded lands were to benefit all people ofHawai'i and not just native Hawaiians. Id. Breyer then 
concluded that the Office of Hawaiian Afuirs' electorate did not sufficiently resemble an Indian 
tribe. ld. To Justice Breyer, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was nothing more than "a special 
purpose department of Hawaii's state government." Id. at 526. Although he did not need to 
address the issue, Justice Breyer focused on blood quantum and how the State's definition of 
"Hawaiian" was so "broad" that it "goes well beyond any reasonable limit." !d. Some concluded 
that the Court "relied on the logics of dilution to undennine inclusive conceptualizations of 
Nativeness." j. Kehaulani Kauanui, TIle Politics of Blood mId Sovereignty in Rice v. Cayetano, 25 
POI.. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 110, 118 (2002) [hereinafter Politics of Blood]. In other 
words, for some on the Court, there needed to be a clean delineation by blood quantum of those 
who qualified for benefits and those that did not. 
Indeed, during oral arguments in this case, Justices Kennedy and Scalia pressed the federal 
government's attorney about whether it was okay to allow someone with "148th," "196th," or 
"195th Hawaiian blood" to participate in the Office of Hawaiian Affiirs' elections, thereby sug-
gesting the arbitrariness of ancestry. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 
U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 71. Justice Breyer, a Clinton appointee 
who is usually a consistent liberal vote, noted: "It seems to me ... that everyone who has one 
Hawaiian ancestor at least gets to vote, and more than half of those people are not native 
Hawaiians. They just have a distatU ancestor." !d. at 36. Citing the remoteness of an ancestor, 
Justice Breyer asked, "How do we extend that to people 10 generations later, who had 10 gener-
ations ago one Indian ancestor? I mean that might apply to everybody in the room. We have no 
idea." ld. at 44. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer declared the connection to one Native 
Hawaiian ancestor as meaningless: "There must ... be some limit on what is reasonable, at the 
least when a State (which is not itself a tribe) creates the definition. And to define that membership in 
terms of 1 possible ancestor out of 500, thereby creating a vast and unknowable body of potential 
members-leaving some combination of luck and interest to detennine which potential mem-
bers become actual voters-goes well beyond any reasonable limit." Rice, 528 U.S. at 527 (Breyer, 
j., concurring) (emphases added). In much the same way that opponents of the one thirty-
second blood quantum quota in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act debates argued that such 
dilution of blood made a Hawaiian individual "to all intents and purposes a white personL]" see 
Politics of Blood at 118 (citing Harry Irwin, Hawai'i Attorney General, Statement to U.S. Senate 
(1920)), Justice Breyer's line of questioning and decision implied that dilution of blood quantum 
disqualifies individuals from being members of a sovereign indigenous body. The Court reaf-
firmed the early twentieth century doctrine and again tied indigeneity, and thus sovereignty, to 
blood quantum, which has enabled "white American economic, political, and social domina-
tion" to endure. j. K.F.HAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIAl.ISM AND TilE POLIT-
ICS Of SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 183 (2008). 
40. Eric K. Yamamoto, TI,e Colonizer's Story: The Supreme Court Violates Native Hawaiian 
Sovere(~nty-Again, COLORLINES (Aug. 20, 2000), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/ coloni 
zers-story-supreme-court-violates-native-hawaiian-sovereignty-again. 
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on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application 
to the compelling history of the State of Hawaii. "41 
Following the decision, the plaintiff boldly professed: 
I'm proud to be part of Hawaii's history .... It was good for 
Hawaiians, and certainly good for the state. Got everybody 
thinking. Hawaiians took advantage of being able to play the 
part of victim and get entitlements based on race. They stepped 
over the line. The Rice decision made everyone step back. 42 
The Rice decision indeed made Hawaiians "step back." Yet, future Chief 
Justice and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' then-attorney, John G. Rob-
erts, Jr., saw the decision as a victory: 
The good news is that the majority's OpInIOn was very nar-
rowly written and expressly did not call into question the Of-
fice of Hawaiian Affairs, the public trust for the benefit of 
Hawaiians and native Hawaiians, but only the particular voting 
mechanism by which the trustees are selected.43 
Rice erased from memory the fact that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was 
created as a vehicle to reconcile the harm caused by a century of atrocity 
committed against Hawaiians. Rice questioned the validity of all programs 
that benefitted Native Hawaiians. Rice opened the floodgates to more legal 
challenges to Native Hawaiians and Native Hawaiian programs.44 Thus, 
Rice shifted the momentum from reconciliation to protection. 
41. Rice, 528 U.S. at 527-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Perhaps more troubling, with the 
same stroke of a pen, the Court put civil rights jurisprudence roe-to-toe with indigenous law 
and, pandering to the tenuous arguments of an alleged "color-blind" plaintiff, legitimized the 
continued subordination of Native Hawaiians and failed to live up to the principle of "Equal 
Justice Under Law," as emblazoned across the western tayade of the Supreme Court building. 
The Court (un)successfully sruffed the issue of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' narrowly tailored 
voting scheme into a box of affinnative action and civil rights. As one scholar wrote, "What does 
affirnlative action have in common with Native Hawaiian sovereignty? Absolutely nothing, ex-
cept in the manner that America responds to Peoples of Color." Danielle Conway-Jones, Beyond 
Rice v. Cayetano: Its Impacts and PrO,Rwy: The Perpetuation ~f Pril'ile,Re and Anti-Affirmative Action 
Sentimellt in Rice v. Cayetano, 3 A<;IAN-PAC. L. & POL'y J. 371 (2002). 
42. Eric K. YaUlamoto & Catherine C. Betts, Disfigurin,R Civil Ri,Rhts to Deny Ind~eenolls 
Hawaiian Seif-Determinatioll: TIle Story of Rice v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 541, 546 
(Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eels., Foundation Press, 2008) (citation omitted). 
43. Helen Aitonn & Christine Donnelly, Top Court Backs Rice if I OHA Vote Clzallw,Re, 
HONOLULU STAR-BULL. (Feb. 23, 2000), http://archives.starbulletin.com!2000/02!23/news/ 
story1.html. 
44. See, e.g., Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In this case we are 
called on, yet again, to hear a challenge to state programs restricting benefits to 'native 
Hawaiians' Or 'Hawaiians.' "); Doe v. Kameharneha Schools, 470 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2006) (con-
cluding that "a Hawaiian private, non-profit K-12 educational that receives no federal funds" 
does not violate 42 U.S.c. § 1981 by preferring Native Hawaiians in its admissions policy). 
SPRING 2017] Legacy in Paradise 283 
B. Failed Reconciliation in Congress 
Given the assault on Native Hawaiian programs, on July 20, 2000, 
United States Senator Daniel K. Akaka introduced "A bill to express the 
policy of the United States regarding the United States' relationship with 
Native Hawaiians, and for other purposes[,]" which proposed to formally 
recognize Hawaiians as indigenous people that have a right to self-deter-
mination under federal Indian law. 4S Specifically in response to Rice, Sena-
tor Akaka's bill, later referred to as the Native Hawaiian Government 
Reorganization Act or the Akaka Bill, sought to clarifY the political status 
of Native Hawaiians with the federal government, establish a process to 
create a Hawaiian governing entity that would be "federally recognized," 
and protect various Hawaiian-serving programs from constitutional chal-
lenges. 46 The Akaka Bill specifically called for the creation of a federal 
commission that would certifY a list of Native Hawaiians eligible to create 
a governing body that the United States would recognizeY 
The Akaka Bill, which would go through various iterations and be 
introduced in every Congress for well over a decade, represented an admi-
rable effort by Hawai'i's congressional delegation to facilitate and codifY 
self-governance and self-determination for Native Hawaiians in American 
law.48 Through the Akaka Bill: 
[T]he Native Hawaiian people [sought] the restoration of 
their government, because they know and have witnessed how 
the Federal policy of self-determination and self-governance 
has not only had a dramatic impact on the ability of Native 
communities to take their rightful place in the American family 
of governments, but also how that policy has enabled Native 
people to grow and thrive. 49 
45. S. 2899, 106th Congo (2000); H.R. 4904, 106th Congo (2000). 
46. See S. 2899, 106th Congo §§ 1, 7 (2000). 
47. See id. at § 7(a). 
48. See S. 81, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 617, 107th Congo (2001); S. 746, 107th Congo 
(2001); S. 1783, 107th Congo (2001); S. 344, 108th Congo (2003); H.R. 665, 108th Congo 
(2003); H.R. 4282, 108th Congo (2004); S. 147, 109th Congo (2005); H.R. 309, 109th Congo 
(2005); S. 3064, 109th Congo (2006); S. 310, 110th Congo (2007); H.R. 505, 110th Congo 
(2007); S. 1011, ll1th Congo (2009); H.R. 2314, l11th Congo (2010). 
49. Testimony ofS. Haunani Apoliona on behalf of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Hear-
ing on S. 1011 (August 6, 2009) before Committee on Indian Affiirs of the United States Sen-
ate, at 13. The path of federal recognition for Native Hawaiians was akin to the process that 
now-recognized Indian tribes have gone through to "reestablish" govemment-to-govemment 
relationships with the United States. Since 1970, it has been the "policy"-though not necessa-
rily the practice-of the United States to recognize and support America's indigenous people's 
rights to self-determination and self-governance. See Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-638, § 1,88 Stat. 2203, 2203 (1975) (noting the purpose of the law is 
"[t]o provide maximum Indian participation in the Government and education of the Indian 
people ... "). Federal courts have limited Native American tribal jurisdiction. See Catherine T. 
Struve, Sovere(lin Litigants: Native American Nations in Court, 55 VILLANOVA L. REv. 929, 934-48 
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Thus, federal recognition, for some, meant the conveyance of a special 
status to an indigenous government that could come with a broad array of 
federal protections and benefits. 50 
However, Native Hawaiian views offederal recognition as envisioned 
through the Akaka Bill waned as the political tides shifted toward a more 
conservative American regime. For example, the first draft of the Akaka 
Bill, S. 2899, reflected the concerns of the Hawaiian people. 51 One of the 
principle reasons for the wide support was the inclusion of an express dis-
claimer that historical claims against the federal government by the Hawai-
ian people would not be barred and that international recourse would be 
available to address future claims. 52 Indeed, after public hearings in 
Hawai'i, and in response to those Native Hawaiians pursuing international 
claims, the bill was redrafted to command that, "Nothing in this Act [was] 
intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States, or 
to affect the rights of the Native Hawaiian people under international 
law."53 At the time, some of the opposition to the Akaka Bill was "based 
only on principle" as the disclaimer clearly set forth a protection of an 
(2010) (summarizing federal common law limitations on tribal authority). The outcome of the 
federal recognition process is a nation-within-a-nation model in which the Indian tribe is pro-
vided some forms of independence, but is in all other respects still part of the United States. 
50. See COHEN'S HANDllOOK OF FEDERAl. INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3] (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., 2005). The federal recognition experience of other indigenous peoples provides ample 
evidence of both the successes and pitfalls of such a process. For some indigenous conmlUnities, 
federal recognition has brought more control to the conununity and has been a means to better 
themselves through the availability of services and an afIinnation of their existence. See Mark D. 
Myers, Federal Recoj?nition of indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STANf'ORD L. & POI.'y REV. 
271, 277 (2001) ("Now people are going to believe we exist .... To be told you are unrecog-
nized stabs you right in the heart."). For others, being federally recognized has, among other 
things, brought with it uncertainty in how a tribal govenunent will enforce its laws and, more 
importantly, has brought with it an abdication of some powers to the federal govenunent. ld. 
Opponents of federal recognition often cite the haml and violence of recognition politics, in 
which, on the one hand, the process defines who is "deserving" of rights and citizenship, but, on 
the other hand, expressly defines who is not "deserving" of rights and citizenship. See AMY E. 
DEN OUDEN & JEAN M. O'BRIEN, RECOGNITION, SOVEREIGNTY STRUGGI.HS, AND INDIGE-
NOUS RIGHTS IN TilE UNITED STATES 2 (2013): 
[I]ndigenous struggles for recognition in the twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies are deeply rooted in history. They have entailed complex confrontations 
and engagements with U.S. federal and state laws and policies, and they are strug-
gles that remind us of the destructive power of the racial stereotypes and popular 
myths about Indians that persist today and that have obscured not only how native 
nations and communities see themselves but also what they have sumlounted to 
sustain themselves as peoples. 
51. S. 2899, 106th Congo § 10 (2000). 
52. ld. 
53. ld. 
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international recourse. 54 Over time, and in an effort to capitulate to the 
demands of the Bush II Administration and most Senate Republicans, the 
Akaka Bill became watered down. The express disclaimers stating that the 
rights of Native Hawaiians would not be foreclosed in the international 
arenas were eliminated and replaced with provisions that mandated federal 
oversight and waiver of any claims against the federal government. 55 Be-
cause of the elimination of the protective disclaimers, some Native 
Hawaiians vigorously opposed the Akaka Bill as it would foreclose Native 
Hawaiians from pursuing independence under international law. 56 
Opposition to the Akaka Bill also came from pro-American conserv-
atives, both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian, who viewed the "special treat-
ment" of Native Hawaiians as unconstitutional and inconsistent with their 
ideal of equality. One commentator vilified those lawmakers that sup-
ported the passage of the Akaka Bill: "the legislation is an important symp-
tom of Democrats' constitutional flippancy and itch for social engineering. 
'One nation, indivisible'? Not for the House majority or the Senate com-
mittee that has approved Akaka's mockery of the Pledge of Allegiance. "57 
Conjuring the imagery of the Jim Crow-esque system in South Africa, 
attorney H. William Burgess suggested that the Akaka Bill would create 
"apartheid" in Hawai'i. 58 Burgess was a member of the Grassroot Institute 
of Hawaii-an organization staunchly opposed to the Akaka Bill that 
would, through the guise of promoting democratic principles, unnecessa-
rily incite fear through propaganda and misinformation. 59 
Leading the opposition's charge against the Akaka Bill in the Senate 
was Arizona Senator Jon Kyl, the chairman of the Senate Republican Pol-
54. R. Hokulei Lindsey, Akaka Bill: Native Hawaiians, Legal Realities, and Politics as Usual, 
24 UNIV. HAw. L. REV. 693, 721 (2002). 
55. See S. 3064, 109th Congo § 8(c) (2006). 
56. Professor Kauanui concluded, "Because of the limits on independent national sover-
eignty under the proposed plan for federal recognition, dozens of Hawaiian sovereignty groups 
have persistently and consistently rejected the application of U.S. federal Indian law that would 
recognize a Hawaiian domestic dependent nation-as ward to guardian-under the plenary 
power of Congress." J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Resistinj( the Akaka Bill, in A NATION RISING: 
MOVEMENTS FOR LIFE, LAND, AND SOVEREIGNTY 318-19 (Goodyear-Ka'opua, ed., Duke 
Univ. Press 2014). Other amendments made to appease Washington lawmakers included ban-
ning gambling activities, precluding the United States from taking any Native Hawaiian lands 
into trust, and removing the need for additional consultation of the Native Hawaiian governing 
body by the United States military. See S. 3064, 109th Congo § 9 (2006). 
57. George F. Will, Social Engineers in Paradise, WASil. POST, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www 
.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynl content/article12007 1111281 AR2007112802053.html. 
58. H. William Burgess, Federal Recoj(nition Will Result in Legal Apartheid, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Oct. 1, 2000, at B4. 
59. SeeMaileArvin.DistortingOptics:PoliticaIVisibilityinHawaii.MAILE VINE (Jan. 25, 
2008), https:/ I mailevine. wordpress. com/2008/0 1 125/ distorted-optics-political-visibility-in-
hawai'i (criticizing a racist cartoon published in the Hawaii Reporter that characterized the Of-
fice of Hawaiian Ailiirs' enrollment effort "Kau Inoa"). 
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icy Committee.60 In the summer of 2005, Kyl released a thirteen-page 
report, titled "Why Congress Must Reject Race-Based Government for 
Native Hawaiians."61 In the Kyl Report, the Republican Senator argued 
that the Akaka Bill created a race-based government that promoted "racial 
division and ethnic separatism."62 The Kyl Report further advised Repub-
lican Senators, "Congress should not be in the business of creating govern-
ments for racial groups that are living in an integrated, largely assimilated 
society .... If Congress can create a government based on blood alone, 
then the Constitution's commitment to equality under the law means very 
little."63 Kyl's efforts were supported in concept and in funding by the 
Grassroot Institute.64 
To bolster support of the Akaka Bill, Hawai'i's congressional leaders 
enlisted the help of Republican Governor Linda Lingle and her Adminis-
tration to curry favor with Republican lawmakers. Lingle-a rare Repub-
lican leader in a State dominated by the Hawai'i Democratic Party and a 
rising star of the national Republican Party-specifically met with those 
undecided Republican senators to rally support. Governor Lingle shot 
back at the lobbying efforts of Senator Kyl for his "false" statements: "His 
opinion is wrong, his facts are wrong and now it's up to us to make clear 
where he's mistaken, to make it clear to his colleagues."65 By June of2005, 
many supporters were confident that the Akaka Bill had the necessary 
fifty-one votes to become law.66 
On July 14, 2005, the Bush II Justice Department sent a letter to 
Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, 
informing him that the Bush II Administration had four concerns with the 
Akaka Bill: limitations periods, military matters, criminal jurisdiction, and 
gaming.67 Akaka Bill supporters welcomed the letter as it was the first time 
that the Bush II Administration commented on the proposed legislation 
and because it did not express concerns with the constitutionality of the bill. 
Amendments were proposed to the bill to allay the concerns of the Bush II 
60. Gordon Y.K. Pang, Litl,Rle Fires Back at Foe oj Akaka Bill, HONOl.ULU ADVER.TiSER., 
June 24, 2005, at Al, A13. 
61. Id. 
62. Republican Policy Committee, S. 147 Offends Basic American Vailles: H11Y COtlJireSS 
Mllst Reject Race-Based Govemmetlt Jor Native Hawaiians, at 2 (June 22, 2005). 
63. [d. at 13. 
64. 151 CONGo REe. S6645 (daily ed. June 15, 2005) (statement of Senator Kyl). Indeed, 
Kyl inserted into the congressional record several documents titled "Hawai'i Divided Against 
Itself Cannot Stand," which was written by Washington attorney Bruce Fein, who was under 
contract with the Grassroot Institute. [d. 
65. Gordon Y.K. Pang, Lin,Rle Fires Back at Foe oj Akaka Bill, HONOLULU ADVERTiSER., 
June 24, 2005, at Al, A13. 
66. [d. 
67. Richard Borreca, Akaka Bill Prospects Brighter, HONOl.Ul.U STAR-BuLLETiN,July 14, 
2005, at Al, A9. 
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Administration, but those amendments also alienated pro-nationalist 
Hawaiians. 6H 
With the Bush II Administration's concerns seemingly addressed and 
Republican support trickling in, the stage was set for a vote by the United 
States Senate on September 6, 2005. 69 Before the vote could be taken, 
however, Hurricane Katrina decimated the Gulf Coast and the work of 
Congress came to a halt so legislators could address the emergency.70 The 
vote was postponed indefinitely.?! 
The Bush II Administration subsequently raised constitutional con-
cerns with the legislation: "As the Supreme Court has stated [in Rice], 
whether Native Hawaiians are eligible for tribal status is 'a matter of some 
dispute' and 'of considerable moment and difficulty.' "72 It was yet another 
setback to the Akaka Bill. Mter lobbying efforts with the Senate's Repub-
lican leadership to schedule a vote on the Akaka Bill proved unfruitful, and 
after a shameful vote by the United States Commission on Civil Rights to 
recommend that Congress not pass the legislation,73 Senator Akaka took 
to the Senate chambers in May 2006, and vowed to take the Senate floor 
every day until a vote on the bill was called.74 Mter three days, Senator 
Akaka announced that the Republican leadership would petition for a clo-
ture to force a vote on the bill following the Senate's May recess. 75 
Debate in the Senate was limited to three hours. 76 The debate and 
vote came during a week when Senate Republican leadership brought va-
rious measures that appealed to the party's conservative bloc, including a 
constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage and a bill to repeal the 
estate tax. 77 One commentator recognized, "[ a]lthough both measures 
failed to gain enough votes, the objective was to stir up the conservative 
Republican base to turn out to vote this year and divert attention from less 
68. See supra note 56. 
69. Gordon y.K. Pang and Zenaida Serrano, Vote on Akaka Bill Postponed Indefinitely, 
HONOLULU AoVbKTISER, Sept. 6, 2005, at A1, AS. 
70. !d. 
71. Jd. 
n. Derrick DePledge & Gordon Y.K. Pang, Feds Still Objects to Akaka Bill, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Sept. 22, 2005, at A1, A2. 
73. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGIITS, BRIEFING REpORT: TilE NATIVE HAWAI-
IAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION ACT OF 2005 (2006). 
74. 152 CONGo REc. S4151 (daily ed. May 8, 2006). 
75. Cloture is a procedure under the Senate's rules to halt a filibuster and bring pending 
legislation for a vote by Senators; cloture required a vote by three-fifths of the Senate, or sixty 
Senators to break a filibuster. See RICHARD S. BETH & VAI.ERIE HEITSilUSEN, CONGo RE-
SEARCII SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CI.OTURE IN TilE SENATE 9-10 (2014). 
76. See Akaka Bill Faces Crucial Vote, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, June 7, 2006, at A8. 
77. 152 CONGo REC. S5439-5484 (June 6, 2006) (debate regarding S.]. Res. 1, the Mar-
riage Protection Amendment, which defined marriage as the "union of a man and a woman"); 
id. at S5509 (considering H.R. 8, which relates to repealing the "death tax"). 
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flattering issues such as the Iraq war and rising gasoline prices. "78 In other 
words, it appeared to have been a calculated strategy by Senate Republi-
cans to rally their base in support of conservative causes. Ignoring the spe-
cial treatment that had been given to Native Hawaiians for over a century 
and the federal government's commitment to reconciliation through the 
Apology Resolution-Senate Republicans instead utilized the debate pe-
riod to lament their opposition to the Akaka Bill and any form of political 
recognition of Native Hawaiians. For example, invoking the Rice march of 
"color-blind" justice and again refusing to accept that Native Hawaiians 
should be treated similarly to Native Americans and Alaska Natives, Re-
publican Senator Jeff Sessions stated: "It is not too much to say the legisla-
tion could create a crack in the American ideal of equal rights and color-
blind justice. This would be a huge step. It is a step we must not take. "79 
Senator Akaka took the floor and reminded his colleagues of the in-
tent of the legislation: "At the heart of it, this bill is about fairness[.] ... 
[it] provide[s] a structured process to finally address long-standing issues 
resulting from a dark period in Hawaii history, the overthrow of the 
[K]ingdom of Hawaii."80 Then-Illinois Senator Barack Obama spoke of 
the need to reconcile: 
... [M]any of you know that I was born and raised in Hawaii. 
Anyone who has been fortunate enough to visit or call Hawaii 
home, as I once did, and as my grandmother and sister and 
adorable niece still do, anybody who has spent time in Hawaii 
cannot help but recognize the uniqueness of the place. In addi-
tion to its scenic landscapes and rich history, it is the living 
legacy of aloha-the spirit of openness and friendliness that is 
ingrained in the shared, local culture that shapes and enhances 
each island encounter and experience. 
Throughout Hawaii's history, individuals of all nationali-
ties, races and creeds have found solace in Hawaii. In large part 
this stems from the culture of Native Hawaiians, who have al-
ways acknowledged and celebrated diversity. This incorpora-
tion of new cultures and practices over the years has 
strengthened and unified the community. And as the child of a 
black father and a white mother, I know firsthand how impor-
tant Native Hawaiian efforts are to foster a culture of accept-
ance and of tolerance. 
78. Dennis Camire, Akaka Bill: After the Defeat, HONOLUl.U ADVERTISER, June 9, 2006, 
at A1, A12-A13. 
79. 152 CONGo REc. S5563-64 (June 6, 2006). 
80. ld. at S5561 (emphasis added). Rebuking the notion that the legislation would divide 
people in Hawai'i, Senator Daniel K. Inouye said, "I want Congress to know that, if anything, 
this will unite the people of Hawaii .... I think it is about time that we reach out and correct the 
wrong that was committed in 1893." !d. at S5570. 
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For this reason, I am proud to join Senator [Akaka] to 
extend the Federal policy of self-governance and self-determi-
nation to Native Hawaiians. Native Hawaiians are a vital part of 
our Nation's cultural fabric, and they will continue to shape 
our country in the years to come .... 
As Americans, we pride ourselves in safeguarding the 
practice and ideas of liberty, justice, and freedom. By support-
ing this bill, we can continue this great American tradition and 
fulfill this promise by affording Native Hawaiians the opportu-
nity to recognize their governing entity and have it recognized 
by the Federal Government. . . . 
This bill gives us an opportunity not to look backward but 
to help all Hawaiians move forward and to make sure that the 
Native Hawaiians in that great State are full members and not 
left behind as Hawaii continues to progress. 81 
289 
Senator Obama's eloquent plea, however, likely fell on deaf ears as, 
earlier that day, the Bush II Justice Department sent a letter to Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist concluding that the Akaka Bill was: 
further subdividing the American people into discrete sub-
groups accorded varying degrees of privilege. As the President 
has said, 'we must ... honor the great American traditions of 
the melting pot, which has made us one nation out of many 
peoples.' This bill would reverse that great American tradition 
and divide people by their race. 82 
One lawmaker called the Justice Department's letter "grossly disin-
genuous" as the Bush II Administration's concerns were all addressed in 
the revised version of the bill,83 and that the Republican leadership used 
the letter as a statement of the Bush II Administration's position to shore 
up those last few votes from undecided Republicans. 84 
The Senate Democrats in attendance, including Obama and New 
York Senator Hillary Clinton, voted unanimously in favor of the motion 
to invoke cloture. 85 Future Republican presidential candidate John Mc-
Cain, joined by fellow Arizona Senator John Kyl, crossed over the aisle and 
supported bringing the Akaka Bill up for a vote to end debate consistent 
with a promise McCain had made as Chairman of the Senate Indian M-
81. [d. at S5576. 
82. Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. William E. Moschella of the U.S. Dep't ofJustice 
Office of Legis. Affairs to the Honorable Bill Frist, S. Majority Leader (June 7, 2006), at 1 
(brackets omitted) (on file with author). 
83. Crystal Kua & Gregg K. Kakesako, Linjlle Resolute After Bill Dies, HONOLULU STAlt-
BULLETIN, June 9, 2006, at A15 (regarding the statement of U.S. Senator Daniel K. Inouye). 
84. Id. 
85. 152 CONGo REC. S5640 (June 8, 2006). 
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fairs Committee. So Republican Senator Ted Stevens recalled how previous 
congressional representatives' fears of the unique treatment of Alaska Na-
tives was unjustified and never panned out: "Time has proven them wrong. 
This bill will fulfill our federal obligation to these native Hawaiian 
people. "S7 
But it was not enough. The motion to invoke cloture was defeated 
56 to 41.88 In the end, the cloture vote was four votes short of the neces-
sary amount to bring the Akaka Bill to a final up-or-down vote by the 
Senate. 89 The Senate Republicans, shirking their commitment to reconcil-
iation with Native Hawaiians, stonewalled the process. After six years of 
legislative maneuvering and millions spent to get the federal government 
to anti-up to its reconciliatory promises, the Senate failed to even bring 
the legislation to the floor. 
C. Stalling Reconciliation 
Despite the setback, Senator Akaka would continue to introduce his 
signature legislation.90 The Akaka Bill, however, did not get the same 
amount of attention from lawmakers as it did in 2006. In 200S-no doubt 
because of the dissatisfaction with the Bush II Administration's policies 
and actions-Senator Barack Obama and his "blue wave" won back the 
Presidency and CongressYl After the election results settled and with the 
defection of Republican Arlen Specter to the Democratic Party in April 
2009, the Senate Democrats had the required sixty votes needed to over-
86. McCain added: "I would like the record to reflect clearly, though, that I am unequiv-
ocally opposed to this bill and that I will not support its passage should cloture be invoked." !d. at 
S5636. Alaska's Republican Senators Ted Stevens and Lisa Murkowski, both loyal friends of 
Inouye and Akaka, joined McCain, Kyl, and eight other Republicans to invoke cloture. 
87. ld. 
88. ld. at S5640. Democratic Senators Chuck Schumer and John D. Rockefeller, IV, 
were not present to vote. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a co-sponsor of the Akaka Bill, 
failed to make it back to the chamber in time to cast his vote. See Dennis Camire, Akaka Bill: 
After the Defeat, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 9, 2006, at A12-AI3. Some saw Graham's ab-
sence as a "sign of the pressure that was being put on Republicans by party leadership and the 
White House not to support the bill." !d. 
89. While it could have been approved by a narrow majority in the Senate, there was little 
chance that the Akaka Bill would have received President Bush's signature given his Justice De-
partment's concerns, and an even slimmer chance that the Akaka Bill had a superrnajority of 
votes in the Senate to override a presidential veto. 
90. See S. 81, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 617, 107th Congo (2001); S. 746, 107th Congo 
(2001); S. 1783, 107th Congo (2001); S. 344, 108th Congo (2003); H.R. 665, 108th Congo 
(2003); H.R. 4282, 108th Congo (2003); S. 147, 109th Congo (2005); H.R. 309, 109th Congo 
(2005); S. 3046, 109th Congo (2006); S. 310, 110th Congo (2007); H.R. 505, 110th Congo 
(2007); S. 381, ll1th Congo (2009); S. 708, I11th Congo (2009); S. 1011, ll1th Congo (2009); 
H.R. 2314, I11th Congo (2009); S. 675, 112th Congo (2011); H.R. 1250, 112th Congo (2011). 
91. Adam Nagourney, Obama: Radal Barrier Falls in Dedsive Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2008, at A1. 
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come a filibuster and to move forward with their agenda.92 Although the 
time was ripe (filibuster proof Senate and clear presidential support), there 
was little movement to bring the Akaka Bill up for a vote as other issues, 
such as universal health care, captured the attention oflawmakersY3 Then, 
on August 25, 2009, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy passed away.94 
Mter a special election, Republican Scott Brown filled Kennedy's vacant 
seat. 95 The Senate Democrats lost their super-majority and their opportu-
nity to move legislation, like the Akaka Bill, to final votes. Putting aside 
the likely unified support by Senate Democrats, the Akaka Bill still had 
Republican allies, like Alaska's Lisa Murkowski. But, Senator Akaka took 
the risk of putting forth an amended version of the bill that Hawai'i's Re-
publican Governor refused to support.96 
By 2010, however, the political atmosphere had become so partisan 
that the election brought in a new tranche of Republican legislators who 
refused to support the Akaka Bill.97 In an attempt to pass the legislation 
during the lame-duck session of 2010, President Obama's Attorney Gen-
eral, Eric Holder, and Interior Secretary, Ken Salazar, sent a letter to the 
Senate leaders requesting passage of the Akaka Bill.98 The Obama Admin-
istration recognized: "Of the Nation's three major indigenous groups, Na-
tive Hawaiians-unlike American Indians and Alaska Natives-are the 
only one that currently lacks a government-to-government relationship 
with the United States."99 Despite the Obama Administration's plea, the 
Akaka Bill never again made it to the Senate floor. 
The 2011 version of the Akaka Bill, the final one introduced by Sen-
ator Akaka, was his swan song. lOO It was co-sponsored by Hawai'i's senior 
Senator Daniel K. Inouye and Alaskan Senators Murkowski and Mark Be-
92. Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Specter Switches Parties: More Heftfor Democrats, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at Ai. 
93. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(Mar. 23, 2010). 
94. John M. Broder, Social Causes Defined Kennedy, Even at the End of a 46-Year Career in 
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at Ai. 
95. Michael Cooper, C. 0. P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at 
Ai. 
96. See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Nat. Res. Comm. Republicans, 
Hawaii Governor Expresses Opposition to Latest Version of Native Hawaiian Recognition Bill 
(Feb. 23, 2010) (on file with author) ("Ultimately, although we had good and productive discus-
sions, the current draft of the bill is not one I can support."). 
97. Jeff Zeleny, C. o.P. Captures House, But Not Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at Ai. 
98. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y Gen. & Ken Salazar, U.S. Sec'y of the 
Interior, to Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (Dec. 9, 2010) (on file with author). 
99. ld. 
100. S. 675, 112th Congo (2011). See Carl Hulse, For Akaka, a Senate Role as No. 1 on the 
Roll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012112/26/us/politics/for-akaka-
a-senate-role-as-no-l-on-the-roll.html (noting Akaka's retirement after his failed attempt at 
"pursuing a measure to win sovereignty for native Hawaiians ... "). 
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gich. 101 It sailed through The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, which 
Akaka chaired, but never received a vote by either the Senate or the Re-
publican-controlled House of Representatives before Congress ad-
journed. 102 As Senator Akaka had previously announced his intention to 
retire and with the unexpected passing of Senator Inouye, the Akaka 
Bill-and thus any movement toward reconciliation with the federal gov-
ernment-was dead. 103 
II. FORGING A NEW PATH FOR RECONCILIATION AND FACILITATING 
THE REESTABLISHMENT OF HAWAIIAN GOVERNANCE 
With the dramatic failure of the Akaka Bill in Congress and little 
prospect of the passage of similar legislation given the Republican control 
of the Senate, a new path forward needed to be devised. A new strategy for 
reconciliation needed to be pieced together. The strategy involved the 
State laying a foundation by funding a roll of Native Hawaiians and Presi-
dent Obama's bold use of his presidential power to pass an administrative 
rule detailing a path for the reestablishment of a formal relationship be-
tween the federal government and the Hawaiian community. 
A. Laying the Groundwork: Act 195, the Native Hawaiian Roll 
Commission, and the State if Hawai'j 
Sensing that recogrutlon efforts through Congress had stalled, in 
2011, the Hawai'i State Legislature passed Act 195, which created a Native 
Hawaiian Roll Commission whose responsibilities included facilitating 
reconciliation by preparing a roll of "qualified Native Hawaiians."104 Gov-
ernor Neil Abercrombie-the former Congressman that shepherded the 
Akaka Bill through the House of Representatives-choked up after sign-
ing the bill: "This bill is the first step in seeing to it that we have a Native 
Hawaiian governing entity. It's not only the first step, it is a practical mani-
festation of all that has gone on before."105 Indeed, it was an effort to 
"rekindle momentum for Hawaiian self-governance after the Akaka Bill 
stalled in Congress."106 The roll commission's chair, former Governor 
John Waihe'e, was more blunt, stating that the "valiant effort of [Senator] 
101. S. 675, 112th Congo (2011). 
102. S. REP. No. 112-251, at 1-45 (2012). 
103. Robert D. McFadden, Daniel Inouye, Hawaii's Quiet Voice of Conscience in Senate, Dies 
at 88, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. IS, 2012), http://www.nytimes.comI2012112/18/us/daruel-inouye-
hawaiis-quiet-voice-of-conscience-in-senate-dies-at-S8.htmI. 
104. 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 195, at 64S. 
105. B.J. Reyes, New Law Upholds Hawaiian Identity, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER,July 
7, 2011, at AI, A9. 
106. Ian Lind, What's the Point of CettinJi on the Sovere1Jinty Roll?, HONOLULU CIv. BEAT 
(Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.civilbeat.coml2013/0S/19643-hawaii-morutor-whats-the-point-
of-getting-on-the-sovereignty-roll. 
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Akaka was ... yesterday's news."I07 Waihe'e continued, "Act 195 was 
really a stroke of genius[.],,10H 
Under Act 195, the government simply required the publication of 
the list of individuals: "The publication of the roll of qualified Native 
Hawaiians ... [was] intended to facilitate the process under which quali-
fied Native Hawaiians may independently commence the organization of a 
convention of qualified Native Hawaiians, established for the purpose of 
organizing themselves."109 Act 195 required that an individual on the roll 
be "a descendant of the aboriginal peoples who, prior to 1778, occupied 
and exercised sovereignty in the Hawaiian islands," and who has "main-
tained a significant cultural, social, or civic connection to the Native Ha-
waiian community and wishes to participate in the organization of the 
Native Hawaiian governing entity[.]"110 
In practice, Act 195 simply required the roll commission to collect 
and compile a list of individuals sharing common characteristics. Despite 
some legislators' visions, Act 195 by its terms did not mandate any conduct 
or set any eligibility requirements for an election. 111 The roll commission's 
responsibility was no different than what the government, through agen-
cies like the United States Census Bureau or the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
already did-collect information that could then be sorted. Courts across 
the country have upheld the collection of demographic data pertaining to 
race. 112 These courts have been clear that the mere collection of data is dis-
tinguishable from using such information to classifY individuals and treat 
them different from others.l13 
The language of Act 195 that referenced an intent to "facilitate" a 
process and serve as a "basis" for qualified Native Hawaiians to reorganize 
107. Anita HofSchneider, More Than 130,000 Native Hawaiians Sign Upfor Nation Building, 
HONOLULU Ov. BEAT (May 5, 2014), http://www.civilbeat.com/2014/05/2200S-more-than-
130000-native-hawaiians-sign-up-for-nation-building. 
lOS. ld. 
109. 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 195 (emphases added). 
110. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 10H-3(a)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. 2014); 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 195, 
at 649. 
111. See id. at 646-51. 
112. Morales v. Daly, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 803-20 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the 
Constitution "does not prohibit the gathering of other statistics, if 'necessary and proper,' for the 
intelligent exercise of other powers enumerated in the constitution, and in such case there could 
be no objection to acquiring this information through the same machinery by which the popula-
tion is enumerated, especially as such course would favor economy as well as the convenience of 
the government and the citizens" (citation omitted)). 
113. United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277,280 (1st Cir. 1976) ("In our opinion, 
the challenged regulations represent a reasonable administrative effort to fill up the details which 
Title VII implied but did not specifY. The information which the regulations require a state to 
furnish on the EEO-4 form is essentially raw statistical data which, properly interpreted, can 
provide an intelligent basis for determining whether the state may be guilty of an unlawful em-
ployment practice within the purview of Title VII." (quotation marks and citations omitted)); 
Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d, 803-20 (2000). 
294 Michi,Ran Journal if Race & Law [VOL. 22:273 
was merely aspirational. Act 195 in no way created a binding commitment 
to sanction a specific process that would lead to the establishment of a 
Hawaiian governing entity.114 Pursuant to Act 195, once the roll was pub-
lished, Native Hawaiians themselves could then use (or not use) that roll in 
whatever way they deemed necessary. Once the roll commission com-
pleted its publication, it could seek dissolution from the Governor. 115 
Thus, under the enacted law, other than compiling and verifYing the roll, 
the State would not participate in the details of creating or reorganizing a 
Hawaiian governing entity.116 
The roll commission's campaign to register Native Hawaiians, called 
Kana'iolowalu, was unsuccessful at the beginning. The Commission spent 
over $1.8 million to register fewer than 10,000 Native Hawaiians. 117 
Within two years, the roll commission registered only 17,225 people out 
of an approximately 527,077 Native Hawaiians throughout the United 
States. 118 Partially due to confusion and/or a registration paralysis from 
previous efforts by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to enroll Native 
Hawaiians, the roll commission was not successful. l19 The roll commis-
sion's lack of success was also attributable to it being an arm of a State that 
itself had done tremendous violence to Native Hawaiians and the cause of 
self-determination. 120 
114. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 10H-2 and 4 (Supp. 2014); 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 195, at 
64R-49. 
115. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10H-6 (Supp. 2014); 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 195, at 650. 
116. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10H-2 (Supp. 2014); 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 195, at 64R. 
117. Ian Lind, What's the Point ojCetting on the Sovere(Rnty Roll?, HONOLULU CIv. BEAT 
(Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.civilbeat.comI2013/0S/19643-hawaii-monitor-whats-the-point-
of-getting-on-the-sovereignty-roll. 
l1R. ld. 
119. See OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AI'I'AIRS, 2004 ANNUAl. REPORT 5 (2004), http://190£32x 
2y133sS04xzaOgf14. wpengine. netdna-cdn. com/wp-content/ uploads/ 2015 / 01 /0HA2004AR 
.pdf ("In support of OHA's nationhood goal, one of the most significant initiatives launched in 
FY -04 was the Kau Inoa registration on Jan. 17, 2004. This community-driven effort is an 
integral step in forming a Native Hawaiian governing entity."). The Kau Inoa campaign was 
preceded by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' emollment effort called Operation 'Ohana. See 
OIHCE O~ HAWAIIAN AF~AIRS, RESEARCI I DIVISION DATA BOOK, http://www.ohadatabook 
.com/OHA_research.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) ("Operation 'Ohana was a Native Hawai-
ian registry program designed to locate, identifY and register Hawaiians worldwide."). 
120. See Noe Goodyear Ka'opua, Can't You See Us Rising?, KE KAupu HEHI ALE, https:l/ 
hehiale.wordpress.comI2015/05I1S/cant-you-see-us-rising (last visited Apr. 10,2017): 
[S]ettler state-sponsored programs have never solved the problems that the occu-
pier's presence created in the first place: houselessness, pollution, diminished local 
food production, substance abuse, and the overall devaluation of 'Oiwi ways of 
living .... [Y]ou are asking us to submit to a process initiated by that very state. 
In so doing, the new governing entity would enter any negotiation for a land base 
from a weakened position right from the get go. 
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As a runaround to the lack of support, in 2013, the State Senate 
fashioned a last-minute solution. In an interesting political maneuver, the 
State Senate "gutted and replaced" a bill regarding service of process, with 
a bill that mandated that the roll would include anyone that had registered 
in the prior enrollment efforts or anyone that met the ancestry require-
ments of Kamehameha Schools. 121 The State Senate's legislation, while 
met with little opposition at the time-likely due to its belated nature-
was signed into law as Act 77. 122 Act 77 allowed for the transfer of names 
and information from the various enrollment processes. 123 This law expo-
nentially grew the size of the roll to upwards of 130,000.124 In simply 
compiling a list of qualified Native Hawaiians, the State took the first steps 
to assist in the reconciliation efforts. 
B. Fortifying the Foundation: Obama Administration's Rule 
In 2014, in response to a call for federal action and consistent with 
the Ninth Circuit's invitation for the Interior Department to "appl[y] its 
expertise to ... determine whether native Hawaiians, or some native Ha-
waiian groups, could be acknowledged on a government-to-government 
basis,"125 the Obama Administration issued an Advance Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking ("ANPRM").126 Through the ANPRM, Obama's In-
terior Department sought comments on the following questions: 
[ 1] Should the Secretary propose an administrative rule that 
would facilitate the reestablishment of a government-to-
government relationship with the Native Hawaiian 
community? 
[2] Should the Secretary assist the Native Hawaiian commu-
nity in reorganizing its government, with which the 
United States could reestablish a government-to-govern-
ment relationship? 
[3] If so, what process should be established for drafting and 
ratifYing a reorganized Native Hawaiian government's 
constitution or other governing document? 
121. See 2013 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 77, at 139-40. Kamehameha Schools is a private edu-
cational institution that provides education to indigent children, with a preference for children of 
Native Hawaiian ancestry. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 470 F.3d 827,829 (9th Cir. 2006). 
122. 2013 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 77, at 139-40. 
123. [d. at 140 ("requiring the inclusion of "all individuals already registered with the State 
as verified Hawaiians or Native Hawaiians through the office of Hawaiian affairs as demonstrated 
by the production of relevant office of Hawaiian affairs records"). 
124. See Anita HofSchneider, More Than 130,000 Native Hawaiians S(lill Up for Nation 
Building, HONOLULU Clv. BEAT (May 5, 2014), http://www.civilbeat.comI2014/05/22008-
more-than-130000-native-hawaiians-sign-up-for-nation-building. 
125. Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir. 2004). 
126. Procedures for Reestablishing a Government-to-Government Relationship With the 
Native Hawaiian Community, 79 Fed. Reg. 35296, 35296-303 (June 20, 2014). 
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[ 4] Should the Secretary instead rely on the reorganization of 
a Native Hawaiian government through a process estab-
lished by the Native Hawaiian community and facilitated 
by the State of Hawaii, to the extent such a process is con-
sistent with Federal law? 
[5] If so, what conditions should the Secretary establish as pre-
requisites to Federal acknowledgment of a government-to-
government relationship with the reorganized Native Ha-
waiian government?127 
Following issuance of the ANPRM, a delegation from the Obama 
Interior and Justice Departments traveled across the State and through the 
continental United States to listen to hours of testimony regarding the five 
inquiries. 128 During the many hours of public comment, the Obama dele-
gation heard a vocal segment of Native Hawaiians opposed to any federal 
effort to reestablish a government-to-government relationship.129 
Despite the vocal opposition to the federal rule-making process, on 
October 14, 2016, the Interior Department announced a final rule that 
would create a pathway for a Native Hawaiian Governing Entity 
("NHGE") to reestablish a government-to-government relationship be-
tween Native Hawaiians and the United States (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Rule" or "Part 50").130 The Rule, 43 C.F.R. part 50, outlined the 
criteria that the federal government would consider in its determination of 
whether to reestablish a relationship with a requesting reorganized 
NHGE.131 The Interior Secretary would assess the NHGE's request and 
127. fd. at 35297. 
128. See Procedures for Reestablishing a Fonnal Government-to-Government Relation-
ship With the Native Hawaiian Community, 81 Fed. Reg. 71278, 71317 (Oct. 14, 2016) (to be 
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
129. Some opponents premised their arguments on the belief that the United States had no 
jurisdiction over Hawai'i as Hawai'i was an occupied sovereign nation. See Testimony ofWil-
liamson B.C. Chang at Public Meeting Regarding Whether the Federal Government Should 
Reestablish a Government-to-Goverrunent Relationship with the Native Hawaiian ConmlUnity, 
at 94-96 (June 23, 2014), https:! Iwww.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/ohr/reorg/up 
load/Hawai-i-State-Capitol-Honolulu-0-ahu-062314.pdf. See also Julian Aguon, Native 
Hawaiians and lntemational Law, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A TR1'ATISE 355-402 (Kameha-
meha Publishing 2015) (analyzing the theories of Hawai'i's independence under international 
law). 
130. See Procedures for Reestablishing a Fornw Government-to-Government Relation-
ship With the Native Hawaiian Community, 81 Fed. Reg. at 71317. On October 1, 2015, the 
Obama Administration announced its Notice of Proposed Rule Making. See Procedures for 
Reestablishing a Formal Govenmlent-to-Government Relationship with the Native Hawaiian 
Community, 80 Fed. Reg. 59113 (proposed Oct. 1, 2015). (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
The final Rule made several revisions to the NPRM. See Procedures for Reestablishing a Formal 
Government-to-Government Relationship with the Native Hawaiian Community, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 71278, 71291 (Oct. 14, 2016). 
131. See 43 C.F.R. § 50.16 (2016). 
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use the following criteria in determining whether to reestablish a formal 
relationship: 
(a) The request includes the seven required elements described 
in [section] 50.10;132 
(b) The process by which the Native Hawaiian community 
drafted the governing document met the requirements of 
[section] 50.11;133 
(c) The process by which the Native Hawaiian community de-
termined who could participate in ratifYing the governing 
document met the requirements of [section] 50.12; 134 
(d) The duly ratified governing document, submitted as part of 
the request, meets the requirements of [section] 50.13; 135 
(e) The ratification referendum for the governing document 
met the requirements of [sections] 50. 14(b)-(c) and was 
conducted in a manner not contrary to Federal law; 136 
(f) The elections for the government offices identified in the 
governing document, including members of the governing 
body, were consistent with [section] 50.15 and were con-
ducted in a manner not contrary to Federal law[.]137 
132. Section 50.10 of the Rule requires: (1) a written narrative describing how governing 
documents were drafted; (2) a written narrative describing how it was determined who could 
participate in any ratification of a governing document; (3) a ratified governing document; (4) a 
written narrative describing how the governing document was adopted or approved; (5) a writ-
ten narrative describing how and when elections for government offices were conducted; (6) a 
resolution of the governing body requesting the reestablishment of a government-to-government 
relationship with the United States; and (7) a certification that the submission was the request of 
the governing entity. 43 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2016). 
133. Section 50.11 of the Rule requires a description of "how the process ensured that the 
document was based on meaningful input from representative segments of the Native Hawaiian 
community and reflects the will of the Native Hawaiian community." 43 C.F.R. § 50.11 
(2016). 
134. Section 50.12 of the proposed rule requires that the request explain the processes for 
verifYing that participants were Native Hawaiians and for verifYing those who were also HHCA 
Native Hawaiians. 43 C.F.R. § 50.12 (2016). 
135. The governing document submitted to the Interior Department must, inter alia, in-
clude the government's official name, prescribe the manner in which the government exercises 
its sovereign powers, establish the government's structures and institutions, authorize the govern-
ment to negotiate with the State and federal governments, provide for periodic elections, de-
scribe the criteria for membership, protect and preserve the liberties, rights, and privileges of all 
persons affected by the entity's exercise of power, and not be inconsistent with federal law. 43 
C.F.R. § 50.13 (2016). 
136. The NHGE must include, inter alia, a written narrative describing how the Native 
Hawaiian community conducted a ratification referendum and verified whether a potential voter 
in the ratification referendum was a Native Hawaiian. 43 C.F.R. § 50.14 (2016). 
137. 43 C.F.R. §§ 50.16(a)-(f). Section 50.15 of the proposed rule requires the NHGE to 
show that the election of government officials was free and fair, held by secret ballot, and open to 
all eligible Native Hawaiians. 43 C.F.R. § 50.15 (2016). 
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In terms of participation, the Rule required that at least half, and no 
fewer than 30,000, Native Hawaiians must cast a vote in favor of the gov-
erning document; this means that at least 60,000 Native Hawaiians must 
participate in the referendum vote. 138 Of those, 30,000 Native Hawaiians 
that vote in favor of the governing document at least 9,000 must be native 
Hawaiian, as defined by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, and at 
least half of all native Hawaiians must favor the referendum. 13<) 
The Rule was also clear that the process of reorganizing a governing 
body would come from the Native Hawaiian community and not the State 
or the federal government: "Any government reorganization would ... 
occur through a fair and inclusive community-driven process. The Federal 
Government's only role is deciding whether the request satisfies the rule's 
requirements, enabling the Secretary to reestablish a formal government-
to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian government."140 
Some praised Obama's efforts as a "a historic step towards doing 
what is right and just for Native Hawaiians[.]"141 But, the dissidents still 
made their voices heard. Keli'i Akina of the Grassroot Institute-the same 
entity that bitterly opposed the Akaka Bill-sharply criticized Obama's 
action: 
This is yet another attempt by the Department of the Interior to do 
an end run around Congress by assuming powers it simply does not 
have .... The Congress has clearly indicated that they-and not the [Inte-
rior Department]-have the power to recognize a Native Hawaiian gov-
ernment. On multiple occasions, they considered and decided not to pass 
the Akaka Bill, demonstrating that the Constitutional concerns in the crea-
tion of a race-based government were real and unavoidable. 142 
Akina foreshadowed his direct challenge to any effort to reestablish a 
government-to-government relationship. 
C. Na'i Aupuni 
The federal and State governments laid the foundation for reorganiz-
ing a Native Hawaiian government and reestablishing a formal relationship 
with the United States. Although the State and federal governments made 
138. !d. at § 50.16(g). Section 50.16(g) also provides a "presumption" that the Native Ha-
waiian participation criterion is satisfied if more than 50,000 Native Hawaiians vote in favor of 
the governing documents. !d. 
139. ld. at § 50.16(h). Section 50.16(h) also provides a "presumption" that the native Ha-
waiian participation criterion is satisfied if more than 15,000 native Hawaiians vote in favor of 
the governing documents. ld. 
140. Procedures for Reestablishing a Fomlal Govemment-to-Govemment Relationship 
with the Native Hawaiian Community, 81 Fed. Reg. at 71317. 
141. Dan Nakaso, U.S. Says Soverei,Rnty Decision is Hawaiians', HONOI.ULU STAR-A.DVER-
TISER, Sept. 23, 2016, at A9 (statement of Senator Brian Schatz). 
142. Press Release, Grassroot Institute of Hawaii, Grassroot Institute Raises Questions 
About Proposed DOl Rule (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file with author). 
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the initial strides to set up a path for Native Hawaiian self-determination, 
the task of reorganizing a governing body was left to the Native Hawaiians 
themselves. On October 16, 2014, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs stepped 
forward and authorized the use of special trust funds to a neutral third-
party to "facilitate an election of delegates, election and referendum moni-
toring . . . and a referendum to ratify any recommendation of the 
delegates. . . ." 143 
One private organization heeded the call and took it upon itself to 
organize an 'aha or gathering, in which a governing document could be 
drafted and proposed for an eventual ratification vote. 144 That entity, Na'i 
Aupuni, would serve as the backbone of the latest effort to organize Native 
Hawaiians. In its Bylaws, Na'i Aupuni described its creation: 
[T]he Office of Hawaiian Affairs ... authorized and approved 
the use of the Funds to enable Native Hawaiians to participate 
in a process through which a structure for a governing entity 
may be determined by the collective will of the Native Hawai-
ian people by transmitting the Funds to an entity that is indepen-
dent if [the Office of Hawaiian Affairs] and any apparatus of the State 
if Hawai'i. [The Office of Hawaiian Affairs] initially invited 
nine Ali'i trusts, Royal societies and Civic organizations to dis-
cuss the development of this independent body. From that 
group of nine, the following three organizations, each repre-
sented by two individuals, continued the discussion. . . . Even-
tually, the three organizations ... decided that the purpose of 
the entity would be best served if the six individuals in their 
individual capacity and not as representatives of any organiza-
tion should form and lead the independent entity by serving as 
directors of the Na'i Aupuni. 145 
Na'i Aupuni sought funding from the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to 
conduct its own election of delegates, a convention, and a possible ratifica-
tion vote. 146 The Office of Hawaiian Affairs thereafter provided Na'i 
Aupuni with $2,595,000.00 of Section 5(f) trust funds as a grant for Na'i 
Aupuni to coordinate its own election efforts. 147 The grant agreement 
143. Akina v. State, No. 1: 15-cv-00322-JMS-BMK, at 652-56 (April 29, 2015) (Grant 
Agreement Between the Akamai Foundation and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs for the Use and 
Benefit of Na'i Aupuni). 
144. See Akina v. Hawaii, 835 F.3d 1003, 1008 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) (defining 'aha as 
"[m]eeting, assembly, gathering, convention, court, party" (citation omitted)). 
145. Exhibit 4: Bylaws ofNa'i Aupuni, Akina v. State of Hawaii, No. 15-00322 (D. Haw. 
2015), ECF 79-6. 
146. Exhibit 5: Grant Agreement, Akina v. State of Hawaii, No. 15-00322 (D. Haw. 
2015), ECF 79-7 [hereinafter Grant Agreement]. 
147. !d. The court has held that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs can use Section 5(f) trust 
funds for any purpose so long as the funds provide a benefit to native Hawaiians as defined in the 
300 Michi,Ran Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 22:273 
mandated that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs would not" directly or indi-
rectly control or affect the decisions of [Na'i Aupuni.]"14H The Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs thereby provided Na'i Aupuni with a "no strings at-
tached" grant for Na'i Aupuni to conduct its own independent election of 
delegates for Hawaiian people to consider whether and, if so, in what 
form, a Hawaiian governing entity should be reorganized. Na'i Aupuni, 
on its own accord, decided to use the State's roll as a basis for its election 
because it believed that it was too expensive and time-consuming to have 
to create a new list of Native Hawaiians. 149 The roll also provided the most 
comprehensive list of individuals as it included the lists compiled by the 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs in its various registration efforts.lso With the 
framework in place, and a contract with an election vendor secured, Na'i 
Aupuni commenced the election process in the summer of 2015. 
Native Hawaiians criticized the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' support 
ofNa'i Aupuni. The unity that was initially sought was falling apart. Sov-
ereignty-proponent Walter Ritte stated: 
I am totally opposed to this idea of giving [five] individuals the 
reigns and letting them steer our canoe[.] I've never seen these 
people involved in the efforts over the years to build our nation. 
Somehow, before we strike this deal, we need to clean this up, 
because we can't build our nation in the sand. We need a solid 
foundation, but this is not the foundation that we were told 
would represent US. 1S1 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. See Day". Apoliolla, 616 F.3d 918, 924-28 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawai'i 62, 74-79, 315 P.3d 213, 225-30 (2013). 
148. See Grant Agreement, supra note 146. 
149. Declaration of James Kuhio Asam at 8-9, Akina v. State of Hawaii, No. 15-00322 (D. 
Haw. 2015), ECF 79-1 [hereinafter Declaration of Asam] (,,[p]rior to entering into the below 
described Grant Agreement, [Na'i Aupuni] informed [the Office of Hawaiian Affairs] that it 
intended to use the Roll but that it might also look into whether there are other available lists of 
Native Hawaiians that it could also use to form its voter list. ... Another issue that [Na'i 
Aupuni's] directors discussed was the utility of available lists of adult Native Hawaiians other 
than the [Native Hawaiian Roll Commission's] list. Mter considering this issue for over two-
months, [Na'i Aupuni's] directors detemuned that the [Native Hawaiian Roll ConU1ussion's] 
list was the best available option because it is extraordinarily expensive and time consuming to 
compile a list of Native Hawaiians."). 
150. Declaration of Karnana'opono Crabbe at 3, Akina v. State of Hawaii, No. 15-00322 
(D. Haw. 2015), ECF 83-1 ("[The Office of Hawaiian Affairs] compiled a database of all veri-
fied Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians ... who have registered for one or more of[the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs'] registry programs including Operation 'Ohana, Kau Inoa and the Native 
Hawaiian Registry[.]"). 
151. Will Caron, OHA Pushes Fonvard With Nai AI/puni Despite COllcems, HAWAII INDEP. 
(May 28, 2015), http://hawaiiindependent.net/story/oha-pushes-forward-with-nai-aupuni-de 
spite-concerns. 
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Some cautioned that this recognition process mirrored those in In-
dian Country.152 There, the goal of the federal government was assimila-
tion so that the government could divest the native people of their claims 
to lands. 1s3 
The reorganization nevertheless moved forward. Na'i Aupuni used 
the roll to seek delegates for its 'aha. 154 Na'i Aupuni's independent process 
called for a gathering of forty elected delegates representing various geo-
graphic locations, including several delegate seats for Native Hawaiians that 
live in the continental United States. 15S The announcement of candidates 
for delegates was made on September 30, 2015. 156 The list of delegate 
candidates represented, as Na'i Aupuni President J. Kuhio Asam indicated, 
"a good cross-section of the Native Hawaiian community."1s7 Some fa-
vored federal recognition for Native Hawaiians, while others believed that 
the Kingdom ofHawai'i still existed, and that the State and federal govern-
ments had no jurisdiction in the islands. 158 Clearly, the views on the entire 
Kana'iolowalu and Na'i Aupuni process and the Office of Hawaiian Af-
fairs' apparent $6.8 million involvement were diverse. 159 But, after over a 
decade of jockeying, the process of reconciliation finally reignited under 
President Obama's watch. 160 
152. Jon Osorio, Pondering Independence, HAWAII INDEP. (Oct. 3, 2015), http://hawaiiinde 
pendent.net/story/pondering-independence. 
153. See id.; see also GLEN SEAN COULTHARD, RED SKIN, WHITE MASKS: Rl'JECTING THE 
COLONIAL POLITICS 01' RECOGNITION 17 (Univ. Minn. Press 2014) (recognizing from other 
examples across the globe that "when delegated exchanges of recognition occur in real world 
contexts of domination the terms of accommodation usually end up being detemlined by and in 
the interests of the hegemonic partner in the relationship"). 
154. See Declaration of Asam, supra note 149. 
155. Will Caron, Aha May Fail to Give Hawaiians True Self-Determinatioll, HAWAII INDEP. 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://hawaiiindependent.net/story laha-may-ful-to-give-hawaiians-true-self-
determination [hereinafter Aha May Faiij. 
156. See Declaration of Asam, supra note 149. 
157. Aha May Fail, supra note 155. 
158. See id. 
159. See Jon Osorio, Pondering Independence, HAWAII INDEP. (Oct. 3, 2015), http:// 
hawaiiindependent.net/story/pondering-independence. 
160. On November 27, 2015, Justice Anthony Kennedy enjoined Na'i Aupuni from 
"counting the ballots cast in, and certifYing the winners" of its election "pending further or-
der ... of the Court." Akina v. Hawaii, No. 15A551, 2015 WL 7691943, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 27, 
2015) (Order). By a five-to-four decision, the conservative majority of the Court subsequently 
enjoined the counting of ballots and certification of winners in Nai Aupuni's election pending 
the disposition of the Ninth Circuit appeal. Akitl<1 v. Hawaii, 126 S.Ct. 581 (Dec. 2, 2015) 
(Mem.). Na'i Aupuni thereafter cancelled its election and invited all prospective delegates to 
attend an 'aha, which was held in February 2016. Akina, 835 F.3d at 1009. The 'aha created a 
constitution for a Native Hawaiian goveming body. Id. 
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III. THE LEGALITY OF THE HAWAIIAN RECONCILIATION EFFORT 
The push for the tripartite strategy of reconciliation for Native 
Hawaiians, which combined the State's Roll, Na'i Aupuni's governance 
process, and the Obama Administration's Rule, undoubtedly raised ques-
tions about the legality of the entire effort. However, as described below, 
the efforts of Na'i Aupuni and the State were upheld as constitutional in 
Akina v. Hawaii, President Obama's Rule is a proper exercise of the presi-
dent's constitutional authority, and the Rule would withstand an equal 
protection challenge if one were raised. 
A. No Close Nexus: The Constitutionality if the Efforts of Na'i Aupuni 
and the State of Hawai'i 
On August 13, 2015, anti-Akaka Bill proponent Keli'i Akina and 
several other individuals, including two non-Hawaiians and three Native 
Hawaiians, filed a lawsuit against the State of Hawai'i, the State Governor, 
the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the Commissioners of the 
roll commission, and Na'i Aupuni to halt the process of reorganizing a 
Hawaiian governing entity.161 Judicial Watch, a "constitutionally conserva-
tive, nonpartisan educational foundation that promotes transparency, ac-
countability and integrity in government, politics and the law[,],,162 
funded the Akina lawsuit. Harkening back to the comments made about 
the Rice decision, Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton stated: 
Who would believe that in this day and age U.S. citizens are 
being denied access to the right to vote explicitly because of 
their race and their points of view .... Using a race-based en-
rollment list to help radicals in Hawaii tear the State apart and 
break away from the United States of America is a violation of 
the U.S. Constitution and basic federal voting rights law. And 
that Hawaiian officials would prevent you from voting if you 
don't sign up for their racial apartheid theories is an affiont to 
the First Anlendment. Our clients who are being denied their 
core constitutional rights believe courts can't shut down this 
racist scheme soon enough. 163 
161. Akina, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1112. Other individuals filed separate lawsuits against Na'i 
Aupuni and its directors. See Amsterdam 1'. Na'i Aup"mi, Case No. 1:15-cv-00447-JMS-RLP (D. 
Haw. 2015); Fuller 1'. Nai Aupuni Directors, Case No. 1:15-cv-00470-HG-BMK (D. Haw. 2015); 
Kealoha 1'. 1ge, Case No. 1:15-cv-00478-JMS-BMK (D. Haw. 2015). 
162. Press Release, Judicial Watel! Announces New Team Member Robert D. Popper, JUDICIAT. 
WATCH: PRESS ROOM (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-roomlpress-releas 
es/judicial-watch-announces-new-team-member-robert-d-popper. 
163. Press Reiease,Judicial Watcll Files Civil R(~hts Lawsuit to Stop Race-Based Separatist Vote in 
Hawaii, JUDICIAL WATCII: PR"SS ROOM (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press 
room/press-releases/judicial-watch-files-civil-rights-lawsuit-to-stop-race-based-separatist-vote-
in-hawaii. 
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In their Complaint, the plaintiffs asserted nine counts against the de-
fendants. 164 The thrust of their lawsuit was that the roll commission's list 
of registered and eligible voters, and Na'i Aupuni's process of creating a 
Hawaiian governing entity, each violated the federal Constitution and the 
Voting Rights Act. 165 Specifically, and as in Rice, the non-Hawaiian plain-
tiffs asserted that Act 195, which detailed a process for creating the roll, 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act because it allegedly 
denied the plaintiffs the right to vote on account of race. 166 
To succeed in their claim, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 
section 1983, the plaintiffs needed to show that Na'i Aupuni was a state 
actor. 167 But, as the facts showed and as the district court held in denying a 
motion for preliminary injunction, "because [Na'i] Aupuni's election is a 
private election, [Na'i] Aupuni is not a state actor. . . . Its election does 
not fit under the public function test of state action, which requires a pri-
vate entity to be carrying out a function that is traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the State ... [n]or does [Na'i] Aupuni's election fall under 
a joint action test, which asks whether state officials and private parties 
have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitution-
al rights. "168 The district court specifically concluded that there was 
164. The Plaintiffi asserted the following claims against the Defendants: (1) violation of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.c. § 1983; (2) violation of the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.c. § 1983; (3) violation of the Voting Rights Act, 52 
U.S.C. § 10301; (4) violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments for alleged viewpoint-
based restrictions relating to voting; (5) violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and 42 U.s.c. 
§ 1983; (6) violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for allegedly disqualifYing candidates 
based upon race; (7) violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for 
the unjustified qualification based on community ties; (8) violation of the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment for the alleged impairment of the fundamental right to vote; and (9) 
violation of the First Amendment for alleged compelled speech by virtue of involuntary registra-
tion. Complaint, Alcina v. State of Hawaii, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Haw. 2015) (No. 15-
00322) [hereinafter Complaint] 
165. Akina, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1112-13. 
166. Complaint, supra note 164. 
167. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (holding that a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that a constitutional deprivation occurred "under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State"). 
168. Akina, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1128 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
district court specifically noted how the use of public trust funds from the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs to conduct an election did not make Na'i Aupuni's election a public election; id. (citing 
Relldell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (noting that the "receipt of public funds does 
not make [the agency's] discharge decisions acts of the State"). Relatedly, native Hawaiians 
Virgil Day, Mel Ho'omanawanui, Josiah L. Ho'ohuli, Patrick L. Kahawaiola'a, and Samuel L. 
Kealoha,Jr., sought court approval to intervene in the lawsuit to argue that the Office of Haw ai-
ian Affairs' expenditure of section 5(f) trust funds should be used solely to benefit native 
Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. The district court, however, 
denied the motion to intervene because the arguments asserted by the proposed intervenors were 
wholly separate from the issues at stake in the Akina litigation, and the motion to intervene 
304 Michigan Journal if Race & Law [VOL. 22:273 
no "close nexus" that would make Na'i Aupuni's election a public 
election. 169 
B. Executive Power: Analyzing the President's Authority Jor 
Native Hawaiian Reconciliation 
With Na'i Aupuni's process and the use of the State's Roll held con-
stitutional, the third and final part of the reconciliation effort-President 
Obama's Rule-must be analyzed. In Akina, the district court clearly ar-
ticulated that it was not deciding "whether the Department of the Interior 
even has the Congressional authorization to facilitate the 'reestablishment' 
of a government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian 
community."170 Although the district court did not address the question 
(as it was never raised), resolution of the President's authority to enact such 
a rule would eventually meet judicial scrutiny likely because of Republican 
opposition to the Akaka Bill and the general conservative disdain for Presi-
dent Obama's use of his executive authority. As discussed below, the Presi-
dent has the legal authority to take executive action creating a separate 
path of reestablishing a government-to-government relationship with Na-
tive Hawaiians. 
The question of whether the President has the authority to take such 
an executive action raises the classic constitutional issue of separation of 
powers and the extent of presidential authority. In his influential concur-
ring opinion in Youngstown, Justice Robert H. Jackson set out a tripartite 
would have inserted issues related to the use of section 5(f) public trust funds, which several 
courts have rejected in the past; see Day, 616 F.3d at 924-28 (concluding that the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs could allocate section 5(f) trust funds to support initiatives, like the Akaka Bill, 
which would benefit all Hawaiians); Kealoha, 131 Hawai'i at 74-79, 315 P.3d at 225-30. For 
these same reasons, the Ninth Circuit subsequently affimled the denial of the intervention mo-
tion; Akina, 835 F.3d at 1111-12. 
169. Akina, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1129. Although it did not need to reach the issue as it had 
concluded that Na'i Aupuni was not a state actor, the district court also addressed the merits of 
an equal protection challenge. The district court recognized the Defendants' "strong argument 
that Mancarl can also apply to uphold Congressional action taken under its power to support 
Native Hawaiians as indigenous people." Akitla, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1130. Much like the U.S. 
Supreme Court did in Rice, however, the district court sidestepped the Mancarl issue as it would 
not reach this "difficult terrain." !d. at 1131 (citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 519). In a bold move, the 
district court instead correctly detennined that the equal protection challenge could withstand 
the stringent strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 1131-33. The district court recounted the numerous 
legal provisions recognizing ilie unique status of Native Hawaiians and the context of Hawaiian 
history under which Act 195 was established. !d. at 1131-32. The district court ilien concluded, 
"It follows that the State has a compelling interest in bettering the conditions of its indigenous 
people and, in doing so, providing dignity in simply allowin,~ a starting point for a process ~f self-
determination." ld. at 1132 (emphasis added). "Dignity"-a teml that had been used months 
earlier by Justice Anthony Kennedy to strike down state bans against same-sex marriage-was 
used quite effectively as the district court's visceral support for the entire effort; see Obe~~efell v. 
Hodges, 135 S.CC. 2584, 2608 (2015) ("They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of ilie law. The 
Constitution grants them iliat right."). 
170. Akina, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1136. 
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framework for evaluating executive action and separation of powers. 171 
First, Justice Jackson concluded that the President's authority is "at its 
maximum" when his actions are pursuant to "an express or implied au-
thorization of Congress[.]"l72 When the President's authority is at its 
zenith, the action is "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the 
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion 
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."173 Second, Justice Jack-
son articulated that there is a "zone of twilight in which [the President] 
and Congress may have concurrent authority" or where the distribution of 
authority "is uncertain."174 In such circumstances, "congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, as least as a practical matter, 
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity."175 The test of whether executive action was appropriate would likely 
"depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law."176 Finally, Justice Jackson con-
tended that the President's power is "at its lowest ebb" when executive 
action is taken that is inconsistent with an express or implied will of Con-
gress. l77 In these situations, courts can sustain Presidential action "only by 
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. "178 Justice Jackson's 
scheme has been subsequently adopted as the "accepted framework" for 
evaluating separation of powers and the validity of executive action. 179 
171. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). In Youngstown, the Court concluded that President Harry 
Truman did not have the authority to issue an Executive Order during the Korean War that 
clirected the Secretary of Commerce to seize and continue to operate the steel mills throughout 
the nation. [d. at 582-84. The Court held that executive authority must derive from either an 
act of Congress or the United States Constitution, and the President's conduct did not amount 
to either. Id. at 588. 
172. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
173. [d. at 637 (footnotes omitted). 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. Id.; if. Medellin v. Texas, 552 US. 491, 531 (2008) (noting, within the context of 
national security, that any presidential action under category two needed to be narrowly "based 
on ... a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Con-
gress and never before questioned." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). It can be argued 
that Medellin, authored by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.-fomler law clerk to then-Associ-
ate Justice Rehnquist at the time of the Dames & Moore decision-limited Justice Jackson's sec-
ond category and required a "longstancling practice" of congressional acquiescence. Unlike in 
Medellin, however, there is a history in this circumstance of congressional acquiescence to the 
President's authority to acknowledge an indigenous community outside of the Part 83 proce-
dures. See infra note 204. 
177. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
178. [d. at 637-38 (1952) (footnotes omitted). 
179. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 US. 654, 669 (1981) (recognizing that "Justice 
Jackson'S classification of executive actions into three general categories [are] analytically use-
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As applied here, President Obama's executive action is consistent 
with the first category of Justice Jackson's framework. lso Although the 
Constitution provides Congress with broad authority to regulate the affairs 
of the nation's indigenous peoples,lSl including Native Hawaiians,lH2 that 
authority does not foreclose the President's power to address indigenous 
affairs. 183 Indeed, the President is provided with the power to execute all 
laws that are passed,184 and he or she is directly responsible for the Interior 
Department,'85 which Congress has expressly vested with authority to, 
"under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such 
fu!."); Medellin, 552 U.S. at 524 ("Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite scheme provides the ac-
cepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area."). 
180. The Rule does not fall within category three of the Jackson framework inasmuch as 
there is no specific legislation precluding President Obama from taking such action. While an 
argument could be made that Congress precluded executive recognition of an indigenous gov-
ernment through a procedure outside the scope of part 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
see Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.c. § 103(3) (1994) ("The Con-
gress finds that ... Indian tribes presently may be recognized by Act of Congress; by the admin-
istrative procedures set forth in part 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations denominated 
"Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe;" or by a 
decision of a United States court[.]"), it is equally clear that Congress has failed to act on the 
President's actions to recognize multiple tribes outside the scope of Part 83. See if/ira note 205. 
181. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate 
Conmlerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes[.]"); 
1 Stat. 137 (1790). See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) 
("Congress has broad power to regulate tribal afIairs under the Indian Conmlerce Clause."). 
There should be no debate that Native Hawaiians, as the indigenous people of Hawai'i, should 
be considered "Indians" or part of an "Indian Tribe" for purposes of constitutional analysis; see 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913) ("Not only does the Constitution ex-
pressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued 
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to 
the United States ... the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all 
dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or terri-
tory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."). See also U.S. 
CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice mid Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]")(emphasis added). 
182. See infra notes 208--09 (citing various laws describing Native Hawaiians as 
indigenous). 
183. See Littlewolf v. Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Though plenary, 
Congress' power is not absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and 
advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitations inhering in ... a guardianship and to pertinent 
constitutional restrictions." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). See ,~enerally F. COllEN, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220--21 (1982 ed.). 
184. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 3, d. 4 ("[H]e shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed[.]"). 
185. 9 Stat. 395, 395 (Mar. 3, 1849) (,,[T]here shall be created a new executive depart-
ment of the government of the United States, to be called the Department of the Interior; the 
head of which department shall be called the Secretary of the Interior, who shall be appointed by 
the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who 
shall hold his office by the same tenure ... and who shall perform all the duties assigned to him 
by this act. "). 
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regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian 
ciffairs and if all matters arising out of Indian relations." 186 
Congress also provided that the President "may prescribe such regu-
lations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of 
any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the accounts of 
Indian affairs. "187 Congress further broadened the scope of presidential au-
thority when it granted power to the Interior Secretary to publish a list of 
recognized tribes that "the Secretary recognizes to be eligible for the special 
programs and services." 1 HH This broad power of recognition was expressly 
affirmed in Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. United States Depart-
ment of the Interior, where Judge Richard Posner stated, "the analogy to 
recognition of foreign governments has prevailed to the extent that Con-
gress has delegated to the executive branch the power if recognition of Indian tribes 
without setting forth any criteria to guide the exercise of that power. "189 Judge 
Posner also stated, "Recognition is, as we have pointed out, traditionally 
an executive function. When done by treaty it requires the Senate's con-
sent, but it never requires legislative action, whatever power Congress may 
have to legislate in the area. "190 Accordingly, when framed within the 
context of presidential authority to deal with indigenous affairs, there is 
little doubt that Congress has expressly and implicitly delegated broad 
power to the President to promulgate an administrative rule to reestablish a 
government-to-government relationship with an indigenous community. 
186. Title 25 US.C § 2 (emphasis added). 
187. !d. at § 9. 
188. Id. at § 479a-l(a) ("The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register a list of all 
Indian tribes which the Secretary reco,~nizes to be eligible for the special programs and services 
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." (emphasis added)); 43 
US. C § 1457(10) ("The Secretary of the Interior is charged with the supervision of public business 
relating to the following subjects and agencies ... Indians." (emphasis added)); 5 U.s.C § 301 
("The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for the 
government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and perfonnance 
of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This 
section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of 
records to the public."). 
189. Miami Nation ofIndians ofIndiana, Inc. v. US. Dep't ofInterior, 255 F.3d 342,345 
(7 th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
190. !d. at 346-47; see also Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1273 (9th Cir. 2004) 
("Federal recognition may arise from treaty, statute, executive or administrative order, or from a 
course of dealing with the tribe as a political entity." (citation omitted)); James v. U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C Cir. 1987) ("Congress has specifically 
authorized the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations. 
Regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come 
within the area of Indian affiirs and relations."); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 134 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) ("Tribes recognized by treaty, statute, adminis-
trative process, or other intercourse with the United States are known as federally recognized 
tribes."). 
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The Court must defer to the President's exercise of his or her recognition 
authority as a political question not subject to review. 191 
In the case of Hawai'i, Congress implicitly authorized the Rule 
through its reaffirmation of reconciliation efforts with Native Hawaiians. 
In 1993, Congress specifically granted the President authority to reconcile 
with Native Hawaiians: "The Congress ... urges the President of the United 
States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the King-
dom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation ifforts between the United States 
and the Native Hawaiian people."l92 Following the legislative pronounce-
ment, the Clinton Interior and Justice Departments issued a report that 
recommended federal recognition of a Native Hawaiian governing body 
through the creation of "a framework for recognizing a govemment-to-
government relationship with a representative Native Hawaiian governing 
body" as a form of reconciliation. 193 In 2004, Congress mandated that the 
Interior Department, through its Office of Native Hawaiian Relations, 
"continue the process oj reconciliation with the Native Hawaiian people[.]"194 
These laws and policy statements are, at the very least, an implied grant of 
authority to the President to facilitate a process of reestablishing a govern-
191. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865) ("In reference to all matters of this 
kind, it is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other political depart-
ments of the government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affiirs."). 
192. Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, § 1(5) (emphasis added). However, in 
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175-76 (2009), the United States Supreme 
Court determined that the "whereas" clauses of the Apology Resolution did not create substan-
tive rights to "cloud" title ofland in Hawai'i, but, relevant to this discussion, did not expressly 
address the Congressional grant of authority to the President to support reconciliation efforts. It 
is unfortunate that legislation enacted by Congress and signed by the President, regardless of 
form, can be flaunted as simply a paper with no meaning, yet can be used unilaterally to annex 
an independent nation to the United States; see Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the 
Hawaiian Islands to the United States, 30 Stat. 750 (1898). 
193. DEp'T 01' TilE INTERIOR AND DEP'T or JUST., FROM MAUKA TO MAKAI: TilE 
RIVER or JUSTICE MUST FLOW FREELY: REPORT ON THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS BE-
TWEEN TilE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIVE HAWAIIANS, at 4 (Oct. 23, 2000): 
As a matter of justice and equity, this Report reconmlends that the Native Hawai-
ian people should have self-determination over their own affairs within the frame-
work of Federal law, as do Native American tribes. For generations, the United 
States has recognized the rights and promoted the welfare of Native Hawaiians as 
an indigenous people within our Nation through legislation, administrative action, 
and policy statements. To safeguard and enhance Native Hawaiian self-determina-
tion over their lands, cultural resources, and internal affairs, the Departments be-
lieve Congress should enact further legislation to clarifY Native Hawaiians' 
political status and to create a framework for recognizing a government-to-gov-
ernment relationship with a representative Native Hawaiian governing body. 
194. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 148(b), 118 Stat. 
445 (2004). 
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ment-to-govemment relationship with Native HawaiiansY!S As then-As-
sociate Justice, and fomler law clerk to Justice Jackson, William H. 
Rehnquist, wrote in a post- Youngstown opinion analyzing the breadth of 
executive power: 
[T]he enactment of legislation closely related to the question 
of the President's authority in a particular case which evinces 
legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may 
be considered to invite measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. At least this is so where there is no contrary indi-
cation of legislative intent and when . . . there is a history of 
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by 
the President. 196 
These congressional mandates evince an intent to provide the Presi-
dent with broad independent responsibility in the area of recognizing in-
digenous communities, specifically Native Hawaiians,197 and reestablishing 
formal relationships with those communities. 198 President Obama's pro-
mulgation of the Rule is, thus, "pursuant to an express or implied authori-
zation of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that 
195. In Kahawaiolaa, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Interior Department could 
take action to recognize Native Hawaiians on a government-to-goverrunent basis. 386 F.3d at 
1283 ("We would have more confidence in the outcome if the Department of Interior had 
applied its expertise to parse through history and determine whether native Hawaiians, or some 
native Hawaiian groups, could be acknowledged on a government-to-government basis. It 
would have been equally rational, if perhaps not more 50, Jar the Department to have decided to undertake 
that inquiry in thejirst instance." (emphasis added)). 
196. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In 
Dames & Moore, the Court assessed whether the President had the authority to transfer Iranian 
funds and subsequendy nullif)r legal claims against Iran. ld. at 660. Specifically, President Jimmy 
Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian 
assets in the United States due to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran. 
ld. at 662-63. Claiming that President Carter's executive orders went beyond the scope of exec-
utive authority, Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million in debt from the Iranian 
government. ld. at 666-67. The Court held in favor of executive authority, concluding that the 
IEEPA constituted a specific congressional authorization, thus permitting the President to order 
the transfer of Iranian assets. ld. at 685-87. 
197. The failure to pass the Akaka Bill does not preclude the various legislative enactments 
discussing an intent to recognize Native Hawaiians and treat them as a unique indigenous com-
munity. See infra note 210. 
198. The argument that Congress provided the President with express and implied author-
ity to promulgate the proposed rule is contrary to the position taken by the Bush II Justice 
Department in Kahawaiolaa. There, the Bush II Administration opposed the inclusion of Native 
Hawaiians in the Interior Department's acknowledgement process and argued that that determi-
nation of federal recognition for Native Hawaiians was left to Congress. See Brief for Respon-
dent in Opposition at **9-11, Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 545 U.S. 2902 (2005) (No. 04-1041). 
2015 WL 1112135, at **9-11. However, this position was taken at the height of Bush II Ad-
ministration's conservative march against indigenous rights and reconciliation for Native 
Hawaiians. See supra part I.B of this Article. 
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he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."199 The 
Rule-executive action taken pursuant to broad congressional authoriza-
tion-would be "supported by the strongest presumptions and the widest 
of latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would 
rest heavily upon any who might attack it. "200 
If there is doubt that Congress has authorized presidential action to 
formalize a process to reestablish a govemment-to-government relation-
ship with Native Hawaiians, there is also ample support to show that Presi-
dent Obama's Rule would meet the strictures of Justice Jackson's second 
category as "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence" enabled and 
invited "independent presidential responsibility" on the issue. 201 In 1978, 
the Interior Department established administrative rules for acknowledg-
ing tribes. 202 This independent executive action, which was subsequently 
codified in 25 C.F.R. part 83 (hereinafter referred to as "Part 83"), set 
forth procedures for establishing when an indigenous group would be fed-
erally recognized as an Indian Tribe. Native Hawaiians are not included in 
the federal acknowledgment process under Part 83 as they are not "indige-
nous" to the "continental United States."203 Yet, the courts have upheld 
executive recognition of indigenous communities outside the Part 83 ac-
knowledgnlent process. Indeed, the court acknowledged that "Not every 
group must go through the Part 83 process to be recognized, however; 
Interior may waive the Part 83 process if waiver is, in Interior's view, 'in 
the best interest of the Indians.' "204 The Interior Department has, on 
several occasions, recognized an indigenous community outside of the Part 
83 process.205 Congress has also not taken any action to invalidate those 
199. Youngstoum, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson,]., concurring). 
200. [d. at 637. 
201. See id. (footnotes omitted). 
202. Procedure for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 
43 Fed. Reg. 39361 (Sept. 5, 1978). 
203. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (2015) ("This part applies only to indigenous entities that are not 
federally recognized Indian tribes."); 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2015) (defining "indigenous" as "native 
to the continental United States in that at least part of the petitioner's territory at the time of first 
sustained contact extended into what is now the continental United States" and defining "conti-
nental United States" as "the contiguous 48 states and Alaska"). 
204. See, e.g., Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 212 (D.c. Cir. 2013) 
(citing 25 C.F.R. § 1.2 ("Notwithstanding any limitations contained in the regulations of this 
chapter, the Secretary retains the power to waive or make exceptions to his regulations as found 
in chapter I of title 25 CFR in all cases where permitted by law and the Secretary finds that such 
waiver or exception is in the best interest of the Indians. ")). 
205. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 50862-63 (Sept. 27, 1996) (acknowledging, without going 
through the formal process of Part 83, but based upon a "comprehensive legal review," that the 
Delaware Tribe ofIndians "is a tribal entity recognized and eligible for funding and services fr0111 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs by virtue of its status as an Indian tribe"); see also U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-348, INDIAN ISSUES: FEDERAl. FUNDING fOR NON-FEDER.-
Al.l.Y RECOGNl/:ED TR.IBES 22 (2012) (detailing the over $100 million provided to non-federally 
recognized tribes). 
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recognized groups, and has thus acquiesced to the executive's power to do 
so. Furthermore, in the specific context of Native Hawaiian reconciliation, 
Congress, particularly the United States Senate, failed for over a decade to 
even bring the Akaka Bill to a simple up-or-down vote before the entire 
body.206 Given the inertia or unwillingness to move on its commitment to 
reconciliation, Congress, in essence, invited Obama's executive action. Fi-
nally, the need for reconciliation with Native Hawaiians is imperative as 
the State of Hawai'i and federal government continue their efforts to re-
solve the injustices of the past. 207 Therefore, any argument that the Presi-
dent does not have authority to reestablish a government-to-government 
relationship is without merit as congressional acquiescence and inertia has 
invited such action. 208 
C. Surviving an Equal Protection Challenge 
Assuming a party established standing to file a lawsuit against the 
President and the Interior Department, a lawsuit challenging the Rule 
would also likely include an equal protection challenge. Under an equal 
protection challenge, a plaintiff would likely claim that the Obama Admin-
istration was denying non-Hawaiians the equal protection of the laws by 
treating Native Hawaiians differently. There is ample legal authority to 
206. See supra part LB. of this Article. 
207. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (holding that the validity of 
executive action in category two will "depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables . . . "). 
208. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 6K-9 ("Upon its return to the State, the resources and waters of 
Kaho' olawe shall be held in trust as part of the public land trust; provided that the State shall 
transfer management and control of the island and its waters to the sovereign native Hawaiian 
entity upon its recognition by the United States and the State of Hawaii. "); 1993 Haw. Sess. L. 
Act 340, § 2. 
On November 11, 1993, Congress passed a defense authorization bill specifYing the pro-
cedures for transferring Kaho'olawe to the State. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
of 1994, Pub. L. 103-139, Title X, § 10001(b), November 11,1993 (" ... the United States ... 
shall ... convey and return ... to the State of Hawaii all right, title and interest of the United 
States ... in and to that parcel of property consisting of approximately 28,776 acres of land 
known as Kahoolawe Island, Hawaii and its surrounding waters. Such conveyance of title shall 
occur no later than one hundred eighty days from the date of enactment of this Act[.]"), acqui-
esced to the State's legislative plan of June 30, 1993 to transfer Kaho'olawe to a future Hawaiian 
governing body. Aside from the authority granted to the President to enact a rule to reestablish a 
govemment-to-govenunent relationship with Native Hawaiians, there is a bipartisan history of 
the President taking executive action in Hawai'i. Perhaps the most apt example of this is with the 
executive action of President George H.W. Bush, who ordered the halting of the bombing of 
Kaho'olawe and the transfer of the island to the State ofHawai'i. See generally Jordan K. Inafuku, 
E Kukulu Ke Ea: Hawaii's Duty to Fund Kahoolawe's Restoration Following the Navy's Incomplete 
Cleanup, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'y J. 22 (2015) (criticizing the State for its inattention to its 
trust, responsibilities, and obligation to provide additional funding to restore Kaho'olawe). 
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conclude that President Obama's Rule would be upheld as subject to the 
less-stringent rational basis test set forth in Mancari. 209 
Similar to that of Native Americans and Alaska Natives, and despite 
the failed efforts to obtain federal recognition through the Akaka Bill, both 
the federal and state governments have already recognized the unique and 
special relationship they have with Native Hawaiians. Indeed, and as the 
Obama Administration recognized in its amicus brief in support of Na'i 
Aupuni's process, federal law already states that "Congress does not extend 
services to Native Hawaiians because of their race, but because of their 
unique status as the indiJ!.enous people of a once sovereign nation as to whom 
the United States has established a trust relationship."210 More than 150 
other federal laws recognize Native Hawaiians as akin to Native Ameri-
cans.211 Some federal laws specifically single out Native Hawaiians for spe-
cial treatment not given to Native Americans.212 Moreover, both 
Democratic and Republican Administrations have reaffirmed the "special 
relationship" between Native Hawaiians and the federal government. In 
2004, for example, Congress enacted and President George W. Bush 
signed a law that created the Office for Native Hawaiian Relations within 
the Interior Department.213 The duties of the Office of Native Hawaiian 
Relations included, among other things, to "effectuate and implement the 
specialleJ!.al relationship between the native Hawaiian people and the United 
States" and to "continue the process of reconciliation with the Native Ha-
wanan people[.]"214 
209. Under an equal protection challenge, Na'i Aupuni must show that its allowance of 
only Hawaiians as the electorate "can be tied rationally to the fulEllment of Congress' unique 
obligation toward" the Hawaiian people. Morton v. Mamari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
210. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Alcina v. State of Hawaii, 141 F. 
Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Haw. 2015) (No. 15-00322) (emphasis added); 20 US.c. § 7512(12)(B); 12 
U.s.c. § 1715z-13b (2000) ("To provide access to sources of private financing to Native Hawai-
ian families who otherwise could not acquire housing financing because of the unique legal 
status of the Hawaiian Home Lands or as a result of a lack of access to private financial markets, 
the Secretary may guarantee an amount not to exceed 100 percent of the unpaid principal and 
interest that is due on an eligible loan under subsection (c) of this section."); 20 U.s.c. 80q et 
seq.; 20 U.s.c. 7511 et seq.; 25 U.s.c. 3001 et seq.; 25 U.s.c. 4221 et seq.; 42 U.s.c. 2991 et 
seq.; 42 U.s.c. 3057g et seq.; 42 U.S.c. 11701 et seq.; 54 US.c. 302706; HHCA, Act of July 
9, 1921, 42 Stat. 108, as amended; Act of March 19, 1959, 73 Stat. 4; Joint Resolution of 
November 23,1993,107 Stat. 1510; HHLRA, 109 Stat. 357 (1995); 118 Stat. 445 (2004). 
211. Rice, 528 U.S. at 533 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
212. See Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 67 Pub. L. No. 34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921). 
213. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, Title H, § 148(b), 118 
Stat. 445 (2004). On the State side, numerous laws have reasserted the special treatment of Na-
tive Hawaiians, particularly found in the State Constitution, and a need to "acknowledge and 
recognize the unique status the native Hawaiian people bear to the State of Hawaii and to the 
United States and to facilitate the efforts of native Hawaiians to be governed by an indigenous 
sovereign nation of their own choosing." 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 359, §§ 1(9)-2 at 1010 
(1993). 
214. Pub. L. 108-199, Title H, section 148(b), Jan. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 445. 
SPRING 2017] ugacy in Paradise 313 
As it is clear that both the federal government and the State have 
recognized their unique relationship with the Native Hawaiian commu-
nity, a core issue before a court in ruling on the validity of the Rule would 
be whether the federal government had the authority to treat Native 
Hawaiians in a special manner. There is, as discussed below, strong support 
through the Mancari decision to uphold the special treatment of Native 
Hawaiians. 
In Mancari, a unanimous Court upheld a federal Bureau of Indian 
Affairs policy that favored hiring Native Americans because such "special 
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obli-
gation towards the Indians[.]"215 The Mancari Court determined that hir-
ing preferences ensure Native Americans are given greater participation in 
their own self-governance, further the federal government's trust obliga-
tions to the Native American tribes, and reduce the negative effect ofhav-
ing non-Native Americans administer matters that affected Native 
American tribal life. 216 It specifically held that the Bureau's hiring policy 
was not a "racial preference," but was "an employment criterion reasona-
bly designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make 
the [Bureau] more responsible to the needs of its constituent groupS."217 
The Mancari Court explained and contextualized why, in the case of native 
peoples, the constitutional standard to uphold the law is less demanding: 
Resolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status 
of Indian tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power 
of Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption 
of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf of federally 
recognized Indian tribes. The plenary power of Congress to 
deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explic-
itly and implicitly from the Constitution itself. Article I, [sec-
tion] 8, [clause] 3, provides Congress with the power to 
'regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes,' and thus, to 
this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate 
legislation. . . . The Court has described the origin and nature 
of the special relationship: 
... [T]he United States overcame the Indians and took 
possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an 
uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection 
against the selfishness of others .... Of necessity the United 
States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with 
it the authority to do all that was required to perform that obli-
gation and to prepare the Indians to take their place as indepen-
dent, qualified members of the modem body politic. 
215. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
216. !d. at 541-42. 
217. !d. at 553-54. 
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Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian 
tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with 
the [Bureau], single out for special treatment a constituency of 
tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, de-
rived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to 
help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, 
an entire Title of the United States Code would be effectively 
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward 
the Indians would be jeopardized. 
It is in this historical and legal context that the constitu-
tional validity of the Indian preference is to be determined. . . . 
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this prefer-
ence does not constitute 'racial discrimination.' Indeed, it is not 
even a 'racial' preference .... 
On numerous occasions this Court specifically has upheld 
legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special 
treatment. This unique legal status is of long standing, and its 
sources are diverse. As long as the special treatment can be tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to-
ward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be 
disturbed. 218 
As discussed above, Native Hawaiian-like Native American-is not a ra-
cial classification, but rather a political classification. The analysis, however, 
of whether Mancari applies necessarily rests upon the conclusion that Na-
tive Hawaiians constitute "Indians" or "tribes" under the Indian Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution, subject to the 
"assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status[.]"219 
First, Native Hawaiians could, even under a strict constructionist 
view of the Constitution, be defined as "Indians" and "tribes" for pur-
poses of federal law. Under the terms of the United States Declaration of 
Independence, the term "Indian" referred to the aboriginal "inhabitants of 
our Frontiers."22o The term "Indian" is also "commonly used in this 
country to mean 'the aborigines of America.' "221 In addition, Native 
Hawaiians would also, under a strict constructionist view of the Constitu-
tion, be defined as a "tribe." To be clear, at the time of the founding of the 
country, "tribe" meant a "distinct body of people as divided by family or 
218. !d. at 551-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
219. !d. at 551-52 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3). 
220. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776). 
221. Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 139 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. The 
Native Village of Unalakleet, 411 F.3d 1255 (Ct. Cl. 1969)); see also LUCAS MARTIN ET AI.., 42 
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM INDIANS § 1 (2016) (" 'Indians' is the name given by the European 
discoverers of America to its aboriginal inhabitants."). 
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fortune, or any other characteristic."222 Native Hawaiians are ancestrally 
distinct people with a deeply rooted connection to the land, a distinct 
culture, a distinct religion, and a distinct language.223 
Second, Mancari was premised on the creation of a guardian-ward 
relationship between Native Americans and the federal government. Here, 
and whether one agrees with it or not, there is no contention that Ameri-
can law has created a "guardian-ward" relationship between the Hawaiian 
people and the government. 224 
Third, Mancari was also premised on an attempt to correct injustices 
from the past, such as violent and forcible dispossession of land, and the 
paternalistic notion of "protect[ing]" Native Americans.225 Here, again, 
there is no doubt that sovereignty in the islands was forcibly taken and 
lands systematically stolen from Native Hawaiians,226 and that the federal 
and state governments were attempting to "protect" Native Hawaiian in-
terests by treating them specially.227 
Finally, a federal district court has already acknowledged that the 
Mancari principles apply to Native Hawaiians and that any argument to the 
contrary is "meritless."228 Within the context of native Hawaiian benefi-
ciaries, the Hawai'i Supreme Court also noted the comparison to Native 
Americans: "we are dealing with relationships between the government and 
aboriginal people. Reason thus dictates that we draw the analogy between 
native Hawaiian homesteaders and other native Americans."229 
Because Mancari is applicable in the context of dealing with govern-
mental treatment of Native Hawaiians, any special treatment is subject to a 
rational basis test. 230 Under a rational basis test, the court must assess 
whether a law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.231 
222. TIIOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d 
ed. 1789). 
223. See Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). 
224. See generally H.R. REI'. No. 839, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1920) (noting that the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was premised on the very notion that the "natives of the 
islands" were America's "wards."). 
225. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
226. See Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Historical BackJ?round in NATIVE HAWAllAN LAW: 
A TREATISE 12-38 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 2015). 
227. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. 
228. Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-13 (D. Haw. 1990). 
229. Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 339 (1982). 
230. See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status oj the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & 
POL'y REV. 95,113-14 (1998); but see Stuart Minor Be~amin, Equal Protection and the Special 
Relationship: The Case oj Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 537-38 (1996). 
231. See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) ("This Court has 
long held that a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect 
lines cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between 
the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.") (internal quotation 
marks and ellipsis omitted). 
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In this circumstance, the court would analyze and likely conclude that the 
Rule would satisfY the rational basis test because it is rationally related to 
the government's goal of reconciliation with Native Hawaiians in that it 
provides a path for Native Hawaiian self-governance and control over their 
own affairs. 
IV. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S LEGACY FOR NATIVE HAWAIIANS 
There is no doubt that President Obama's Rule, which is firmly 
rooted in constitutional protection, represents a watershed moment in the 
federal-Native Hawaiian relationship. The Rule puts teeth to the unful-
filled promises of reconciliation as firmly articulated in the 1993 Apology 
Resolution. But, does the Rule provide for true and meaningful social 
healing between the Native Hawaiian community and the federal 
government? 
A. Social Healing ThroulZh Justice Framework 
Professor Eric K. Yamamoto developed a "praxis approach" to the 
healing of communal injustices that has appeal to policy makers and op-
pressed communities.232 This approach may illuminate the federal govern-
ment's current actions and its potential for social healing with Native 
Hawaiians. Yamamoto's framework, titled "Social Healing Through Jus-
tice," merges theories oflaw, theology, social psychology, political theory, 
human rights, economics, and indigenous practices.233 As Yamamoto as-
serts, each discipline's theoretical approach to healing separately offer their 
benefits and their shortcomings. Law, for example, "speaks of equality and 
dreams of truly 'egalitarian' relations-a law-inspired leveling of social and 
economic hierarchies. Yet law also acknowledges that claims to reparations, 
with recent exceptions, have fallen short in the courts. "234 Theology em-
phasizes the "reunification of people according to religious tenets of ac-
knowledgment and atonement. "235 Social psychology "works toward 
transformations in group consciousness and behavior in an effort to address 
present-day and future generational wounds." Political theory highlights 
"reshaping the polity by breaking old barriers and reincorporating people 
at the margins."236 Human rights proponents "seek to change 'legal con-
sciousness' and institutional behavior about what is right and just[,]" but 
such norms are "largely unenforceable absent collective political will. "237 
Economic theory focuses on " 'capacity-building' for those injured by in-
232. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Miyoko Pettit, & Sara Lee, Unfinished Business, 15 ASIAN-PAC. 
L. & POI.'Y J. 2, 7-8 (2014) [hereinafter Unfinished Business]. 
233. !d. 
234. !d. at 8. 
235. [d. at 9. 
236. [d. at 12. 
237. [d. 14-15. 
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justice to remove social structural impediments to societal advance-
ment[,]" but such economic reparations are "quickly sacrificed on the 
altar of government fiscal restraints. "231; Finally, indigenous practices focus 
on righteousness and communal resolution of disputes. 239 
But through his research, Yamamoto identified six common princi-
ples among the various theories: 
(1) mutual engagement by those responsible in some fashion 
and a convergence of their interests in social healing; (2) equal-
ity and fair treatment and at least a partial leveling of one 
group's power over the other; (3) reparative measures addressing 
both the individual and the communal (or societal); (4) eco-
nomic capacity-building and financial assistance for those 
harmed in ways that foster autonomy and self-determination; 
(5) a blend of words and actions that encompass acknowledg-
ments of harms and causes, acceptance of responsibility and re-
construction of relationships in order to fully repair the damage; 
and (6) anticipation and handling of the risks of backlash and 
incompleteness.24o 
These principles serve as the bases for the Social Healing Through Justice 
framework and inform the "conceptual meaning and practical operation of 
the framework's four points of inquiry": recognition, responsibility, recon-
struction, and reparation. 241 
The recognition prong of the framework examines, among other 
things, the way individuals continue to suffer "pain, fear, shame and anger" 
and the way institutions "embody discriminatory policies that deny fair 
access to resources or promote aggression."242 The responsibility prong of 
the framework involves an "assessment of power over others" and analyzes 
the "acceptance of responsibility of repairing the damage ... imposed on 
others through power abuses. "243 Reconstruction, the third prong, seeks 
to "build new production relationships" that bring about "genuine healing 
and a sense of justice restored" through apologies, forgiveness, and/or the 
reallocation of "political economic power. "244 The final prong of the 
framework, reparation, includes an assessment of tangible actions made-
whether through monetary restitution, financial, legal or educational sup-
238. !d. 15-16. 
239. Id. at 16. 
240. Id. at 18-19. 
241. Id. at 19-20. 
242. Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A Social Healillg Through 
Justice ApproiUh to Ullited States-Native Hawaiian alldJapall-Aillu Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 AsiAN 
AM. L.J. 5, 33 (2009) (hereinafter Reframing Redress]. 
243. !d. at 34. 
244. Unfinished Business, supra note 232, at 21. 
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port, rehabilitation, to name a few-to heal the damage done and 
recognized. 245 
In 2009, Yamamoto and Ashley Kaiao Obrey published an article 
critiquing the Native Hawaiian-Federal Government reconciliation efforts. 
In the article, the authors concluded that in the case of Native Hawaiians, 
the federal government satisfied the first two "R's", recognition and re-
sponsibility, through passage of the Apology Resolution and the 1999 
Joint Reconciliation Report by the federal Departments of Justice and In-
terior that recommended recognizing some form of self-governance akin 
to Native Americans.246 The authors concluded, however, that the federal 
government failed to live up to the reconstruction and reparation prongs 
needed to "build a new productive relationship" by failing to pass laws or 
take action that would fully repair past damage and reflect the Native Ha-
waiian community present-day demands for self-determination.247 
B. Although Admirable, the Rule Does Not Engender True Social Healing 
The Obama Administration, as mentioned above, finalized a Rule 
that sets a potentially broader path toward United States acknowledgment 
of a form of self-determination meaningful and acceptable to Native 
Hawaiians. 
Again, the Rule sets forth the "procedure and criteria for reestablish-
ing a formal government-to-government relationship between the United 
States and the Native Hawaiian community[.]"248 To establish such a rela-
tionship, the Native Hawaiian Governing Entity ("NHGE") must submit a 
"request" to the Interior Secretary and that "request" must be granted by 
the Secretary.249 The request must include: a narrative of how the gov-
erning documents of the NHGE was drafted, how the decision was made 
as to who would ratifY the governing documents, how the Native Hawai-
ian community ratified the governing documents, and how and when 
elections were conducted for government offices; a copy of the ratified 
documents; a resolution of the governing body certifYing a request being 
made to the Interior Secretary to reestablish a formal government-to-gov-
ernment relationship; and a certification that the submission is at the re-
quest of the governing body.2s0 The request must describe "how the 
process ensured that the document was based on meaningful input from 
representative segments of the Native Hawaiian community and reflects 
245. ld. 
246. RefratninJ( Redress, supra note 242, at 34, 46. 
247. ld. (identifYing the failure to take concrete action based on principles of self-detenni-
nation in order to truly reconcile with Native Hawaiians). 
248. 43 C.F.R. § 50.1. 
249. ld. at § 50.2. 
250. ld. at § 50.10. 
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the will of the Native Hawaiian community."251 In addition, the Rule 
requires that the minimum number of Native Hawaiians and native 
Hawaiians that need to vote to ratifY the governing documents is 30,000 
and 9,000 respectively.252 Implicit in these minimum voter requirements is 
the federal government's requirement that, at the very least, 60,000 Native 
Hawaiians and 18,000 native Hawaiians must participate in the process be-
cause the Rule requires that the number of Native Hawaiians and native 
Hawaiians that cast votes must exceed half of the ballots sent out.253 If all 
these criteria are met, the United States will form a relationship with only 
"one sovereign" NGHE and that recognition will take effect upon publi-
cation in the Federal Register. 254 The Rule states that the NHGE will 
"have the same government-to-government relationship ... as the formal 
government-to-government relationship between the United States and a 
federally-recognized tribe in the continental United States, in recognition 
of the existence of the same inherent sovereign governmental authori-
ties[.]"255 It also provided the following: 
(b) The [NHGE] will be subject to the plenary authority of 
Congress to the same extent as are federally-recognized 
tribes in the continental United States. 
(c) Absent Federal law to the contrary, any member of the 
[NHGE] will be eligible for current Federal Native Ha-
waiian programs, services, and benefits. 
(d) The [NHGE], its political subdivisions (if any), and its 
members will not be eligible Jor Federal Indian programs, services, 
and benifits unless Congress expressly and specifically has 
declared the Native Hawaiian community ... to be 
eligible. 256 
The Rule mandated: "Reestablishment of the formal governrnent-to-gov-
ernrnent relationship does not affect the title, jurisdiction, or status of Fed-
eral lands and property in Hawaii. "257 
The Rule, like the Akaka Bill, represents a sea of change in the rela-
tionship between Native Hawaiians and the federal government inasmuch 
as the Obama Administration is setting a clear path for potentially validat-
ing some form of a body of Native Hawaiians that would have self-gov-
erning authority. This path is historic inasmuch as it has not been before 
opened to Native Hawaiians, let alone to any other indigenous peoples. It 
251. Id. at § 50.11. 
252. !d. at §§ 50.16(g)-(h). 
253. !d. 
254. Id. at §§ 50.3, 50.42. 
255. Id. at § 50.44. 
256. Id. at §§ 50.44(b)-(d) (emphases added). 
257. Id. at § 50.44(f). 
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is arguably the type of reconstructive action that, under the Social Healing 
Through Justice framework, could lead to social healing because the Rule 
could arguably lead to a "new productive relationship" between the Native 
Hawaiian people and the federal government.258 
However, the Rule falls short of ensuring true social healing. While 
certainly a laudable step toward social healing, the Rule does not, under 
the Social Healing Through Justice framework, go far enough to meaning-
fully reconcile with the Native Hawaiian community. Fundamentally, and 
despite this author's firm belief in the constitutional validity of the action, 
the Rule is promulgated by the Administration and not by Congress and 
therefore leaves greater uncertainty in its validity with a change in regime. 
Simply put, the Rule could be undone by a subsequent President who may 
disagree with the policy. 
Indeed, American voters recently elected Donald J. Trump as the 
President of the United States.259 Trump has called for and enacted bans 
on Muslims to the United States,260 decried Mexican immigrants as "rap-
ists" and criminals,261 positioned his campaign on the promise of building 
a wall across the United States-Mexican border,262 and made his rallying 
cry, "Make America Great Again"-an attempt to delegitimize the strides 
made by President Obama.263 Although he has not specifically addressed 
reconciliation with Native Hawaiians and other marginalized communi-
ties, President Trump has signaled his position with the appointment of 
Senator Jeff Sessions-an ardent opponent of the Akaka Bill-as United 
States Attorney General.2M Trump and Sessions would have at the ready 
an arsenal of tactics to undermine the Rule, including, but not limited to, 
potentially authorizing the Interior Secretary to use his or her discretion to 
258. R~framinR Redress, supra note 242, at 34. 
259. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Tromp Triumphs: Donald Trump is Elected Presi-
dent in StunninR Repudiation oj the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, at Al ("The results 
amounted to a repudiation, not only of Mrs. Clinton, but of President Obama, whose legacy is 
suddenly imperiled."). 
260. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that the State 
argued that President Trump's executive order violated the constitution and was intended to 
disfavor Muslims). 
261. Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASIL POST Oune 16, 2015), 
https:/ Iwww.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 2015 1061 16/full-text-donald-
trump-announces-a-presidential-bidl?utm_ternl=.f141b534798d ("When Mexico sends its peo-
ple, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you .... They're sending people that 
have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. 
They're bringing crime. They're rapists."). 
262. ld. ("I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, 
and I'll build them very inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. 
And I will have Mexico pay for that wall."). 
263. !d. ("Sadly, the An,erican dream is dead .... But if I get elected president I will bring 
it back bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America great again."). 
264. Eric Lichtblau, Poised to Seek ChanRe as Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2016, 
at A15; 152 Congo Rec. S5564 Oune 6, 2006) (Statement of Senator Sessions): 
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deny any applicant for recognition.265 Similarly, if not abandoned by the 
new President, the Rule could be vitiated by a Congress that believes that 
President Obama may have overstepped his executive authority in promul-
gating such a Rule. 266 Hence, there are some inherent flaws in the Rule 
itself As explained below, the Rule alone does not bring about meaning-
ful social healing because it: first, does not "structur[e] everyone's 'power 
to' participate fully and freely rather than to enable one's 'power over' 
others" thereby failing the reconstruction prong, and second, it does not 
provide any reparations. 
First, although the Rule provides a "doorway" toward federal recog-
nition, the Rule still structures American "power over" Native Hawaiians 
in a guardian-ward relationship. As an example, while the federal govern-
ment appeared to call for a neutral process and set a framework to open a 
"doorway" for Hawaiian self-governance, it did so under the auspices of 
federal Indian law, control, and oversight. 267 The Interior Department 
made little effort to reconcile the issue of the loss of Hawaiian sovereignty; 
it simply stated in response to a comment about the "occupation" of 
Hawai'i that: 
Congress admitted Hawaii to the Union as the 50th State 
This express determination by Congress is binding on the De-
partment as an agency of the United States Government that is 
bound by Congressional enactments concerning the status of 
Hawaii. Under those enactments and under the United States 
Constitution, Hawaii is a State of the United States of 
America. 268 
This Nation in its maturity and wisdom must to succumb to any balkanization of 
America .... The [Akaka] bill would result in the State of Hawaii giving up 
substantial lands to the new nation which would begin a downward spiral from an 
America that is based on a shared ideal to one where race, ancestry, our nationality 
constitute a legally approved basis for segregation and really discrimination .... 
This legislation seeks to create an extra constitutional race-based government of 
Native Hawaiians by arbitrarily labeling that race of people as an Indian tribe. 
265. While Trump cannot unilaterally repeal an administrative rule inunediately after his 
inauguration, he could initiate the rulemaking process to repeal the Rule. See Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that an agency may 
only rescind a rule by reinitiating rulemaking and providing a rational reason why a new rule is 
necessary) . 
266. See Mike Lillis, 113 Republicans Back Lawsuit Ajiainst Obama's Immijiration Actions, HIl.!. 
(May 11, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/house!241668-113-republicans-back-lawsuit-
against-obamas-immigration-actions. 
267. Procedures for Reestablishing a Fomul Government-to-Governnlent Relationship 
With the Native Hawaiian Community, 81 Fed. Reg. 71278, 71285 (Oct. 14, 2016). 
268. Id. at 71294. 
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The Interior Department thus regurgitated a skewed narrative of Ha-
waiian political and legal history, ignored the findings of the Apology Res-
olution, and thereby silenced a large segment of the Native Hawaiian 
community that firmly believed that the annexation and referendum on 
statehood were contrary to the law. Moreover, and although some advo-
cates requested it, the Administration refused to insert the following dis-
claimer that the envisioned process would not foreclose international 
recourse: "Nothing in this part explicitly or implicitly abrogates, affects, or 
impairs any claim or claims of the Native Hawaiian people under Federal 
law or International law or affects the ability of the Native Hawaiian peo-
ple or their representatives to pursue such claim or claims in Federal or 
International forums."269 The Administration stated that the Rule "does 
not address any existing claims that the Native Hawaiian people, either 
individually or collectively may assert for redress under Federal or interna-
tionallaw. All such claims are outside the scope of this rulemaking[.]"270 
While this statement arguably leaves the door open for international re-
course, there is nevertheless ambiguity. 
In addition, while Native Hawaiians would have the same "status" as 
other Native American tribes, the Rule makes clear that they would not be 
afforded the same protections as Native Americans, such as the ability to 
decide for itself whether it will allow gaming on its lands. Instead, the 
Rule expressly states that Native Hawaiians would not receive the same 
benefits as an Indian tribe, and implicitly would, therefore, not benefit 
from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which regulates gaming activities 
by federally recognized tribes on Indian lands. 271 Furthermore, the Interior 
Department stated that because the State of Hawai'i prohibits gaming, the 
NHGE would not be permitted to conduct gaming, emphasizing the con-
trol that the State and State law would continue to have over any proposed 
NHGE.272 In practice, this means that the NHGE would have to fight for 
its own benefits and programs and would not be able to partake in the 
resources (albeit grossly inadequate) available to Native Americans. The 
Rule also places the American government in a position of power over the 
Native Hawaiians who must request and lobby every year for State and 
federal resources. In a similar vein, the Rule makes clear that Native 
Hawaiians and the NHGE would, like federally recognized tribes, still be 
under the "plenary" authority of Congress, thereby severely limiting self-
governance and holding Native Hawaiians hostage to the whims of politi-
cal elections and partisanship. 273 
269. Id. at 71315. 
270. ld. 
271. Id. at 71306. 
272. ld. 
273. 43 C.F.R. § 50.44(b). 
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Second, and more importantly, while the form of a NHGE was cer-
tainly left for the Native Hawaiian community itself to decide, the Rule 
did not clarifY how that established relationship would work in practical 
terms and what reparations would be provided, if at all. The Rule does 
state, however, that federal lands in Hawai'i were off the table for an 
NHGE: "Reestablishment of the formal govemment-to-government rela-
tionship does not affect the title, jurisdiction, or status of Federal lands and 
property in Hawaii. "274 In other words, the Interior Department could 
recognize an NHGE, but it would not-at least for the initial recognition 
process-attempt to repair any of the historic injustices by providing land 
for the Native Hawaiians. The Rule is premised on the Native Hawaiian 
people themselves coming up with tremendous funds to conduct a private 
ratification vote that requires at least the participation of 60,000 individu-
alS. 275 There are no provisions for funding or additional resources being 
provided to assist in the actual formation of an NHGE.276 It has also been 
asserted that, after receiving recognition, the NHGE would be able to ne-
gotiate with the State and the federal government for lands and funds. But, 
such statements are noticeably absent from the Rule. 277 Put simply, there is 
no indication of what happens after the reestablishment of the govern-
ment-to-govemment relationship. There is no indication of what steps the 
federal government must take after recognition occurs. Will there be repa-
rations via land, funding, educational, and employment opportunities 
available for Native Hawaiians? Will the federal government ante up for 
the military's destruction ofland and culturally significant sites? Will Na-
tive Hawaiians be afforded an opportunity to repair the harm caused by 
over one hundred years of colonization and suppression? It is not clear. 
Thus, while the Rule promotes quasi-reconstruction it is incomplete as to 
reparations to effectuate meaningful social healing. 
The harm in failing to meaningfully reconcile with Native Hawaiians 
under the Social Healing Through Justice framework poses significant 
problems for the United States as it continues to position itself in the inter-
national arena. In her book, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image if 
American Democracy, Mary L. Dudziak discussed historically how the 
United States' domestic problems with race during a time when American 
foreign policy focused on the containment of communism, was seen by 
developing countries after W odd War II as contradictory to its promotion 
of democratic principles.278 The same principles apply today in the con-
274. !d. at § 50.44(f). 
275. See id. at § 50.16. 
276. See id. at § 50.44(d) ("The Native Hawaiian Governing Entity, its political subdivi-
sions (if any), and its members will not be eligible for Federal Indian programs, services, and 
benefits unless Congress expressly and specifically has declared ... [them] to be eligible."). 
277. See 43 C.F.R. part 50. 
278. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COl.D WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMER.I-
CAN DEMOCRACY (princeton Univ. Press 2000). 
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text of America's self-interest in resolving claims with Native Hawaiians. 
Indeed, American moral authority and its reputation has been severely 
curtailed in recent years because of American imperialist actions across the 
globe, particularly in the Middle East. After the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the United States launched a pre-emptive war in Iraq that destabi-
lized the region. 279 In its "war on terror," the federal government has de-
tained many people and committed human rights violations. 28o For 
example, in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the United States Army and 
Central Intelligence Agency physically and sexually abused detainees. 281 
This conduct led the independent pan-Arab newspaper AI-Quds ai-Arabi 
to write: "the aim of this invasion and occupation was primarily to humili-
ate the Arabs and Muslims and was never for changing the Iraqi dictator-
ship or establishing a model of democracy, justice, and human rights."282 
In Guantanamo Bay, the American military brutally tortured "enemy 
combatants" in contravention of the Geneva Convention signed by the 
United States.283 On the home front, the federal government passed laws, 
like the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, commonly re-
ferred to as the USA P A TRI OT Act, that limited civil and legal rights by 
grossly expanding the ability of the government to use electronic surveil-
lance on both citizens and non-citizens.284 Recently, leaked documents 
showed the breadth of the National Security Agency's intrusive surveil-
lance program on Americans.285 The United States' conduct from the 
early 2000s to now reflects poorly in the international community. Curing 
some of its past local injustices may provide it greater moral authority 
abroad. Therefore, the United States has a significant international interest 
in embracing reconciliation efforts with those that it has oppressed-in-
cluding, among others, Native Hawaiians, Native Americans, and African 
Americans. 
CONCLUSION 
President Obama's legacy for Native Hawaiian self-determination is a 
mixed one. While he has ushered forth a new paradigm for assisting in the 
reestablishment of a government-to-government relationship between the 
279. Iraq War Lies, 13 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2016, at A26 ("Thirteen years later, 
after voluminous studies and books and wave upon wave of terrible consequences, it would seem 
there is no doubt that these leaders created a false case for invading Iraq and then utterly misman-
aged the occupation."). 
280. !d. 
281. Editorial Board, Will Anyone PayIor Abu Ghraib?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at A26. 
282. MELANI MCALISTER, EpIC ENCOUNTERS: CULTURE, MEDIA, & U.S. INTERESTS IN 
TilE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, at 299 (Univ. Cal. Press, rev. ed. 2005). 
283. Id. at 300. 
284. ld. at 275. 
285. Kenneth Roth and Salil She tty, Pardon Snowden, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.15, 2016, at A27. 
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federal government and the Native Hawaiian people, he has failed to take 
the final steps necessary to bring about true social healing. 286 Although his 
Rule is consistent with American law and shares broad support across the 
country, those same actions, for some, ignore principles of international 
law that arguably cast doubt on the validity of American authority in 
Hawai'i. What emerges is a complex portrait of a people fighting for jus-
tice and an American government still coy to take truly reconciliatory 
action. 
In a speech to Pacific Island leaders, in perhaps his last official visit to 
Hawai'i as the Commander-in-Chief, President Obama recalled the 
strength of unity: 
There's an old Hawaiian proverb that loosely translates to: 
"Unite to move forward." It seems simple enough, but the na-
tives used it as a reminder that if you want to row a canoe, every 
oar has to be moving in unison, otherwise, I don't know, you 
go in circles. You just go around and around. Your pace slows, 
you drift. You get caught up in the currents, and you get off 
course. 287 
Although then speaking to the urgency of rising sea levels and the devasta-
tion caused by climate change, the President's words resonate for reconcili-
ation. The cause of reconciliation and true social healing has lingered for 
generations. It is only through cooperation and unity among the Native 
Hawaiian people, the State of Hawai'i, and the federal government that 
social healing can be accomplished. 
As Donald Trump assumes the presidency following a rancorous 
election of partisan divide, he has an opportunity to make drastic changes 
to the cause of self-determination and reconciliation for Native Hawaiians 
and the nation's other indigenous communities.288 President Trump can 
286. See Lehua Kinilau-Cano & Hokulei Lindsey, Problems in Interior's Rule on Hawaii Home 
Lands, HONOLULU CIv. BEAT (July 11, 2016), http://www.civilbeat.orgI2016/07 /problems-in-
interiors-rule-on-hawaii-home-lands (criticizing the Interior Department's rule pertaining to 
Hawaiian home lands). 
287. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to Leaders Jrom the Pacific Island 
ConJerence if Leaders and the International Union Jar the Conservation ~f Nature World Conservation 
Congress (Sept. 1, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov (follow link then use the query 
bar to search archives with title of the piece). 
288. During his eight years in office, President Obarna and his Administration unilaterally 
made significant strides in assisting Native Americans and Alaska Natives. See, e.g., Exec. Order 
No. 13,592, 76 Fed. Reg. 76603 (Dec. 8, 2011) (requiring the Interior Department and United 
States Department of Education "[t]o facilitate a new partnership ... to improve [Native 
American and Alaska Native] education", "take advantage of both Departments' expertise, re-
sources, and facilities" and "address how the Departments will collaborate in carrying out this 
policy"); Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39539 (July 1, 2013) (establishing the White 
House Council on Native American Affairs and reasserting "a national policy to ensure that the 
Federal Government engages in a true and lasting government-to-government relationship with 
federally recognized tribes in a more coordinated and effective manner, including by better car-
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either build upon the work and legacy of President Obama or he can, in 
much the same way that Washington conservatives did, dismantle and 
stonewall any attempts at finding common ground and reconciling. Time 
will tell what President Trump's legacy will be for indigenous Alnerica. As 
President Obama did, President Trump would be wise to heed the Hawai-
ian proverb: "Pupukahi i holomua; unite to move forward." 
rying out its trust responsibilities"); Keepseagle v, Vi/sack, 102 F, Supp. 3d 205 (2015) (Memo, 
Op.) (noting that the Obama Administration settled an eleven year old case of systemic racial 
discrimination of Native American farmers in the United States Department of Agriculture's 
Faml Loan Program for $680,000,000); Press Release, U.S, Dept, of Ed" Department Launches 
New $2 Million Pilot Program to Support State- Tribal Education Partnerships (May 29,2012), https:11 
www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-launches-new-2-million-pilot-program-support-
state-tribal-education-partnerships (last visited Dec, 4, 2016) (investing funds to tribal education 
agencies to increase their role in ilie education of American Indian and Alaska Native students); 
Mitch Smiili, A Crass-Roots Push in the Plains to Block a Pipeline's Path, N,Y. TIMES, May 6, 2015, 
at A12 (noting President Obama's veto oflegislation that would allow the Keystone XL Pipeline 
to proceed-a position supported by the indigenous community). 
In much the same way that the Rule is at risk, President Obama's efforts for Native 
Americans and Alaska Natives are also at severe risk of retrenchment given President Trump's 
historical animosity toward indigenous communities. See Shawn Boburg, Donald Trump's Long 
History oj Clashes with Nati(Je Americans, WASH. POST (July 25, 2016), https:llwww.washington 
post. com! natio nall donald-trumps-long-his tory -of-clashes-with - nati ve-americansl 20 16 I 0 7 I 2 5 I 
80ea91ca-3d77-11e6-80bc-d06711fd2125_story,html?utm_temF ,204471fc0443 (noting that 
Donald Trump "secretly paid for more than $1 million in ads that portrayed members of a tribe 
in Upstate New York as cocaine traffickers and career criminals" and "suggested in testimony 
and in media appearances iliat dark-skinned Native Americans in Connecticut were faking their 
ancestry") , 
